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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON RETAIL AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS
by
David Vitt
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Hakan Yilmazkuday, Major Professor
This dissertation is composed of three essays at the intersection of regional eco-
nomic analysis and industrial organization. In the first chapter, I derive an estimating
equation for retail market structure in order to quantify the effects of e-commerce
competition on brick and mortar retail establishment and employment counts. Using
a multilevel regression specification, I find that (i) e-commerce establishment count
exposure results show heterogeneity in the sign of the effects across the retail sec-
tors represented in the data (ii) the magnitude of the e-commerce exposure effect is
also heterogeneous across retail sectors (iii) the heterogeneity is not purely random
and correlates highly with retail industrial characteristics like the labor share of re-
ceipts and profit margins, (iv) the e-commerce exposure is passed through to intensive
margins like employment.
The second essay turns to a regional focus, where I develop a multilevel difference-
in-difference approach to estimate the causal effects of discontinued Shuttle launches
on the industry and labor markets of Florida’s Space Coast. I find strong evidence
for (i) an across industry substitution effect previously unexplored in the regional
literature(ii) a spike in unemployment of 17% relative to the estimated counterfac-
tual outcome for the region (iii) a contraction in payroll of nearly 10% of regional
GDP in some industries combined with a gain of 7.5% through across industry labor
reallocation.
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In the final essay, I focus on the relationship between the size of retail establish-
ments and the growth of their proximate markets. In accomplishing this, I demon-
strate the utility of Department of Defense satellite images of ambient night light
activity as a measure of the spatial variation in economic activity, as well as a mea-
sure of economic growth. This allowed me to use a dynamic panel regression approach
to test the concentrating effect of market growth on retail firms. I find evidence that
(i) with an autoregressive coefficient closer to 0 than 1 (α = 0.23), establishment
size is not persistent (ii) firms adjustment contemporaneously to economic growth
and discount past growth for hiring decisions (iii) a positive and significant firm size
elasticity with respect to spatial variation in economic activity.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
THE EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIPS EBTWEEN INTERNET USE
INTENSITY AND RETAIL MARKET STRUCTURE
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation
In many ways, the growth of the Internet has effectively decreased the travel costs
we face as consumers, provided we are sufficiently patient. By decreased travel costs
I refer to the magnitude of the cost incurred with having to shop outside our homes.
Data like that presented in (Figure 1.1) show that substitution away from local re-
tail towards e-commerce is significant and strong. Online retail represents only one
dimension of many along which retail and the Internet interact. While increasing
Internet use may put certain types of brick and mortar retail establishments in closer
competition with e-commerce competitors, it also decreases the costs consumers incur
to learn about product characteristics like quality and local availability. As a result,
certain retail industries may find Internet use beneficial and make establishment loca-
tion decisions accordingly. I take increasing Internet use to be a proxy of decreasing
consumer travel costs, and test the direction of the relationship between Internet use
intensity and retail establishment counts while controlling for other market structure
determinants.
I make several contributions to the understanding of retail industrial organiza-
tion, regional commerce, and the determinants of market concentration with this
investigation. The most significant contribution is the updated empirical strategy. I
demonstrate the advantages of using Google Trends to measure consumers’ revealed
preferences over the standard survey based measures. The strategy provides both
extensive and intensive measures of Internet use, showing that the latter is less im-
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portant for determining retail market structure. I also demonstrate the use of a
control function approach to estimating the effect pure e-commerce search intensity
on local brick and mortar retail industries. I then also show that I can instrument for
e-commerce intensity using an appropriately chosen keyword, and show that variation
in e-commerce intensity have consistently negative effects on establishment counts and
the payroll within each industry-state pair. I make a small contribution to the theory
by showing that a Sutton style non-fragmentation result exists under very simple cost
assumptions. This speaks to the role of quality escalation in retail, since it implies
that all growth adjustments are absorbed by incumbent firms on some sort of intensive
margin. The theoretical model is useful because it informs my econometric strategy
to use multilevel linear and non-linear regression models to estimate the Internet and
e-commerce exposure of each industry.
Figure 1.1: Time series of e-commerce as a fraction of total retail sales.
Prior to conducting the econometric investigation, it’s not immediately clear that
increased Internet use should help or hinder a given retail industry. It is reasonable
to suspect that the nature of brick and mortar retail’s relationship with the Inter-
net is highly idiosyncratic to each retail industry in question. For example, retail
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industries with goods that are tradable (in the legal and practical sense) outside the
physical retail location are likely to be more exposed competition with their Internet
counterparts since shipping the good is feasible, a prime example being books and
periodical industries. For some industries, like those in the business of electronic
shopping, or for experiential goods, it’s possible that Internet savvy consumers are
targeted for an expansion of brick and mortar locations in order to “drum up” online
sales. Websites managed by firms and consumers alike provide near costless access
to prices. A prime example is Gas Buddy, which “crowdsources” reporting gas prices
at the establishment level. This in turn allows for price dispersion investigations like
(Yilmazkuday and Yilmazkuday, 2015). The presence of review and feedback web-
sites reduce investment required to gain knowledge of product quality via discussion
boards. Other retail industries are relatively isolated from e-commerce competition
due to legal barriers preventing the shipment of goods via the mail, with gasoline and
alcoholic beverage retail being prime examples. Variation in a stated preference data
source like e-commerce use survey data, as is the standard in the literature, is insuffi-
cient at capturing the nature of the relationship between the brick and mortar retail
and the Internet since it may suffer from imperfect recollection or not be truthful.
To improve on this, I develop a measure that relies on temporal variation in revealed
preferences by using variation in keyword search intensity as a measure of Internet
use intensity.
The question of the influence of e-commerce on brick and mortar retail market
structure is important on account of the implications to the real economy. On the
one hand, if the Internet brings about fewer firms, this in turn may lead to a fall in
regional income as consumers substitute away from local retail. On the other hand,
there is scope for improvements in real income through the effect on prices associated
with concentrating retail into the most cost effective firms. The strategy I develop to
investigate the relationship between Internet use intensity and brick and mortar retail
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is to look at the role of variation in various measures of Internet use as determinants
of brick and mortar retail industrial structure. The ease of online shopping activities
has effectively decreased the travel costs of consumers by allowing them to substitute
away from the convenience of local retail in favor of e-commerce provided they are
adequately patient. Areas with consumers more willing shop online effectively have
lower consumer travel costs since they are able to consume an identical bundle of
goods at a lower level of expenditure. To empirically test the hypothesis I extend a
framework connecting consumer travel costs to retail market structure.
Consumer travel costs have indirectly increased over the past years in spite of
rising fuel prices on account of the competitive tension the Internet has provided for
patient consumers. Expenditure minimizing behavior leads conscious consumers to
consider a convenience-patience trade-off every time they face a major expenditure.
You can imagine that, before putting the keys in the ignition, they try to weigh
the expected markup, probability of stockout and cost of navigating traffic to their
brick and mortar retailer against the lowest priced substitute available through e-
commerce. This trade-off between the convenience of local retail goods and thrift
of their e-commerce substitutes is connected to the consumer’s propensity to use the
Internet as well as their patience. As both dimensions increase, so too will the share of
expenditures being dedicated to purchases online. The presence of this tension, along
with its consequences, can be measured using intensive and extensive measures of
Internet use. Extensive measures, like the percentage of the population with Internet
access, reflect that some states may have better telecommunications structures, more
competitive Internet service providers, and differing preferences for Internet access.
This scale effect of Internet access on its own does not identify the Internet’s effect on
retail market structure, but does measure how well connected a state is on average.
Alone, it is insufficient since it neglects any state level differences in the intensity of
Internet use.
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Extensive and intensive Internet use measures as a consumer travel cost proxy are
developed out of necessity: there is a lack of e-commerce sales data at the industry-
state level, and this measure would undoubtedly be endogenous on account of con-
founding factors correlated with brick and mortar retail market structure. In light
of this, it is necessary first necessary to find a data source that provides information
about Internet use that varies by state over time. Google Trends reports keyword
search frequency on a weekly basis at the state level or higher resolution. The next
step would be selecting a keyword sufficiently general as to capture the widest cross-
section of the consumer base possible. For reasons discussed in further detail in the
empirical section, variation in Google Trends data on searches for “pornography”
across states and time was a natural choice for a variable that measures Internet use
intensity. It is desirable on account of the difficulty of arguing its endogeneity within
the context of the model. For example, suggesting simultaneity bias would imply that
some aspect of retail market structure is in some way influencing consumers to search
more frequently for this keyword, and going through the transmission mechanism
from changes in retail market structure to changes in consumer attitudes towards
pornography shows that any connection would be dubious. Thus, it is a highly de-
sirable measure from an exogeneity standpoint. I also directly address the threat of
e-commerce by using search intensity for “pornography” as an instrument for search
intensity for “amazon.com”. This keyword directly measures consumers’ revealed
preference not only for shopping online, but also for learning about e-commerce.
1.1.2 Related Literature
Reduced form econometric research on the determinants of retail market structure
started with (Berry et al., 1962) and was replicated and further discussed in (Forbes,
1972). In these, the log of retail establishment counts are regressed on the log of
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population using different cross sections of MSAs, with Forbes drawing on a larger
sample. Both estimate the elasticity of retail establishment counts with respect to the
population; (Forbes, 1972) finds an elasticity of 0.96 while (Berry et al., 1962) finds
a lower result near 0.7. A pattern of across retail industry heterogeneity in responses
to population growth is also initially presented in (Forbes, 1972), though not both
are estimated via simple OLS. My results will show that retail establishment counts
are less and differently sensitive to population growth than these previous estimates.
The leading analysis of the relationship between retail market structure and Inter-
net use is (Goldmanis et al., 2010). In this setup, the co-authors quantify the exposure
of retail market share to variation in self reported e-commerce adoption measures for
travel agencies, book stores, and new car dealers. This lays the groundwork in the
field by demonstrating that there is heterogeneity in the exposure of retail industries,
and that increased exposure to e-commerce displaces the least efficient firms in a
manner similar to the reallocation in (Melitz, 2003a). My approach improves this
strategy in that I use within state variation in keyword search intensity as revealed
preference measurement of Internet use intensity, as opposed to a stated preference
survey source restricted to e-commerce. A time varying measure like keyword search
intensity with an appropriately chosen keyword can imply a causal relationship with
variation in generic Internet use intensity, and feels like a more credible identification
strategy since it does not rely on stated preferences. Additionally, instead of focus-
ing on a few retail industries, I conduct an investigation with the entire set of retail
industries represented in the U.S. Census’s Statistics of U.S. Business.
My research does not stand alone in making the connection between Internet use
and various costs faced by the consumer. The relationship between the Internet and
reductions in transportation, communication, and search costs to near zero are ar-
gued in Shapiro and Varian (1999), Cairncross (1997), and Bakos (1997) respectively.
Goolsbee (1999) suggests that the Internet reduces the importance of distance in the
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sense that it frequently allows consumers to avoid local taxes and therefore effectively
increases real wages and consequently welfare. In a more aggregate investigation,
Freund and Weinhold (2004) show that the Internet helps alleviate the influence of
distance on trade. Their investigation suggests that a 10% increase in the web hosts
within a country elicits a 0.2% increase in export growth.
Spatial trade models with retail sectors suggest an inverse relationship between
consumer travel costs and retail establishment counts. To motivate an econometric
estimating equation, I extend the (Eckel, 2009) spatial model of retail competition.
Eckel’s 2009 model seeks to identify how international trade affects retail market
structure through the entry and exit of retail establishments. This is a valid and
important question for many reasons, foremost since the retail industry employs ≈
15.4 million workers, according to December 2014 BLS estimates1. As an industry,
retail represents approximately 11% of the country’s total labor force employment. It
is also easily shown in Eckel (2009) that retail consolidation or fragmentation has real
implications through the price effect on real wages paid to workers in the whole of
the economy. The health of the retail sector is also a concern for participants in the
financial markets, since retail firms compose a substantive part of the NASDAQ and
nearly one quarter of the firms in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The industry
is largely referenced as a leading indicator of the health of the macroeconomy, so
understanding the dynamics in this sector gives perspective on prospective states of
the economy as a whole.
1http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t17.htm
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1.2 Theoretical Model
1.2.1 Preliminaries
First I will show there is a bound to market fragmentation in a spatial retail compe-
tition model that generates a natural oligopoly retail market structure. This model
has the advantage of reaching the same results regarding properties of retail mar-
ket structure while assuming a simpler cost structure than is traditionally needed.
Second, I show that this bound acts as an econometric specification of retail market
structure in a population asymptotic limit, and I develop an econometric strategy
for using the structural equation in practice. I proceed by describing the theoretical
foundations on which my contribution rests, with more details left for the appendix.
I begin by summarizing the spatial retail competition model developed in Eckel
(2009) upon which my contribution draws. The approach begins with a Krugman
(1980) style model of monopolistic competition. As opposed to a true international
investigation, I take the “world” to be the 50 United States in order to use subnational
data, which are free from potentially confounding trade policies. On the demand side,
consumers with CES preferences have a taste for variety as in (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977), along with an iceberg style travel costs associated with visiting retailers. Since
consumers incur a cost to shopping, their utility maximizing decision is to make “one
stop” shopping trips at their local retailer.
A graphical representation of the spatial setup taken directly from (Eckel, 2009) is
found in (Figure 1.2). Consumers and retailers interact in a spatial competition setup
a la Salop (1979). Manufacturing is centrally located, as in the monocentric city model
in Alonso (1964). Each manufacturer produces a single good. Firms and consumers
are distributed uniformly on the Salop circle, whose center is the “manufacturing
hub”. Retailers, free to locate anywhere on the circle, simultaneously decide on
8
Figure 1.2: Retail Equilibrium on the Salop Circle
entry, mark-ups µ over manufacturer’s wholesale prices , and the degree of product
variety. They compete with each other for “catchment areas”, which are given by the
region between a retailer and the farthest consumer who just prefers that retailer over
the next closest retailer in the opposing direction. Each consumer provides 1 unit of
labor inelastically to the retail and manufacturing sectors.
To connect Internet use and travel costs in this setup, I take a change in Inter-
net use intensity to be a change in consumer travel costs. A decrease in absolute
and marginal travel costs (an increase in consumer mobility) in this setup shifts the
manufacturing zero profit line in a way to increase the equilibrium number of man-
ufacturers, and shifts retailing zero profit to reduce the number of retailers. The
relatively more mobile consumers have higher price elasticities of demand, leading to
lower mark-ups at retail. This leads to consolidation until the decrease in margins
is met by increased catchment areas. Welfare effects of the change in mobility are
consequently unambiguous: since mark-ups fall and product variety increases, welfare
rises.
This direct relationship between consumer travel costs and retail market markups
is not unique to the Eckel model. Another influential model of spatial competition
and the implications of transportation costs to market structure follows from Vogel
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(2011). The focus in that investigation is characterizing an asymmetric equilibrium
in a Hotelling model, and the implications of changes in transportation costs are the
same. As consumers become more mobile, they are more easily able to substitute
away from high cost firms, placing these high cost retailers at a disadvantage. This
notion reinforces the relationship between transportation cost and margins in retail-
ing in geographic trade models: price conscious, highly mobile consumers are the
concentrating force in the retail industry. As the consumer becomes more price savvy
and increasingly patient, any individual retailer’s market power falls.
1.2.2 General Equilibrium
Parameter descriptions are provided in (Table 1.1). I leave many of the details from
(Eckel, 2009) in the appendix. The general equilibrium therein is characterized by
simultaneous equilibrium in retail and manufacturing by way of a zero profit condition
for each sector, as well as clearing of labor markets. The zero profit condition for
manufacturing firms depends on the number of retailers through the retail markup,
since demand for manufacturing goods is solely from retailers who provide the good at
a markup to consumers. Substituting the optimal retail markup, µ = τ Ω
R
, into the zero
profit condition for manufacturing allows a solution for the number of manufacturing
firms gives
kL = α(1 + τ
Ω
R
)(σN − σ + 1) (1.1)
The next step is to solve the manufacturing zero profit condition (1.1) for N , the
number of manufacturing firms as a function of the endogenous retail establishment
count R and the exogenous parameters k, α, σ, τ,Ω. Doing so gives an equation for
the number of manufacturing firms that depends on the exogenous parameters and
the endogenous number of retailers, an intermediate step in the process of finding a
10
Parameter Symbol Description
k # regions
Ω
circumference
of circle
L # representative agents
τ adjusts consumer’s absolute/marginal travel costs
σ
consumer’s
elasticity of substitution
between varieties
N # manufacturers
α manufacturer fixed cost
β manufacturer marginal cost
R # retailers
γ
retail marginal cost
of variety
p retail price
pw
price retailers face
from manufactuers
µ
retail markup
p = (1 + µ)pw
Table 1.1: Parameter descriptions
fully reduced equation:
N(k, α, σ, τ,Ω;R) =
kLR + α(σ − 1)(R + τΩ)
ασ(R + τΩ)
(1.2)
To find the equilibrium retail establishment count, I substitute the right hand side
of (1.2) for N in the retail zero profit condition derived on lines (3.13)-(3.15) in the
appendix. Doing so gives an expression quadratic in R :
− γ(α(σ − 1) + kL)R2︸ ︷︷ ︸
A ∗R2
−αγ(σ − 1)τΩR︸ ︷︷ ︸
B ∗R
+αLστΩ︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
= 0 (1.3)
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It’s a good practice to check the discriminant of quadratic expressions like this, in
order to make statements about the properties of the solution.
B2 − 4AC = (−αγ(σ − 1)τΩ)2 − 4(−γ(α(σ − 1) + kL))(αLστΩ)
= αγτΩ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
4kL2σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
 (1.4)
Since (1.4) is strictly positive for permissible values of the parameters, there ex-
ists a single positive root corresponding to the number of retail establishments in
equilibrium. Solving this quadratic expression yields the fully reduced equation gov-
erning retail market structure, R∗, in terms of exogenous parameters, after using
the quadratic formula. Since retail establishment counts are non-negative integers, I
discard the negative root of the equilibrium establishment count, arriving at (3.1):
R∗ =
−αγ(σ − 1)τΩ +√αγτΩ(4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(4Lσ + γ(σ − 1)τΩ))
2γ(kL+ α(σ − 1)) (1.5)
(Figure 1.3) gives a graphical representation of the general equilibrium. Their
intersection pins down an equilibrium number of retailers R∗ and manufacturers N∗.
Comparative statics of this general equilibrium with respect to both consumer travel
costs and to population growth are provided in the Appendix. Verification of (3.1) is
available using the snippets of Mathematica code provided in the appendix.
Motivating an Estimating Equation
To make a retail market structure measure like (3.1) tractable for an empirical in-
vestigation, it is advantageous to take an asymptotic approach similar to the retail
model in Ellickson (2006). In this approach, the total revenue of each firm is evalu-
ated in the limit by allowing an isoelastic demand parameter to make market revenue
12
Figure 1.3: Symmetric General Equilibrium
grow without bound. To replicate the asymptotic approach with a different class of
models, I let L → ∞ and examine the market structure equation in this limit. This
asymptotic result is a variant where the Salop circle is extremely (infinitely) densely
populated. Allowing the circle to become densely populated is the only way of allow-
ing total market revenue in the Salop circle to grow without bound while preserving
a finite price. Evaluating the market structure equation (3.1) in this limit, I arrive at
(1.6):
Let R¯ = lim
L→∞
R∗
=
√
αστΩ√
kγ
= α0.5σ0.5τ 0.5Ω0.5k−0.5γ0.5
(1.6)
Letting tildes represent natural log transformations, R˜∗ = ln(R¯), I arrive at (1.7),
the asymptotic establishment count and bound to market fragmentation:
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R˜∗ist =
1
2
 Ω˜− k˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Time invariant
+ α˜is︸︷︷︸
industry-state fixed effect
+ τ˜st︸︷︷︸
proxy with Internet measures
− γ˜ist︸︷︷︸
payroll data
+ σ˜ist︸︷︷︸
Unobserved
 (1.7)
From left to right in (1.7), the bound to market fragmentation in the asymptotic
limit is governed by factors that are invariant over time and common to all industry-
state pairs such as Ω, the circumference of the “world” in the model, and k the
state/region count. Other retail market structure determinants are assumed to be
time invariant for a given industry-state pair in a short run investigation, and therefore
are captured either by industry − state fixed effects or by industry fixed effects if
further assumptions regarding cross-state heterogeneity are made. One example of
this is αis which represents the fixed cost of production for manufacturers in human
capital terms. If these fixed costs are assumed to be common to an industry, which is
the same as saying they are symmetric across states, then the effects will be captured
in an empirical specification with industry fixed effects. There are market structure
determinants that vary over time and are common to all industries in a state, the only
example in the asymptotic result being τst which represents all exogenous influences
on consumer travel costs. Labor supply, Lst in the unrestricted retail establishment
count equation (3.1) is another example. I will capture variation in travel costs using
state level extensive and intensive measures of internet use over time, discussed further
in the empirical investigation section. Finally, there are idiosyncratic determinants
that vary over time for each industry − state pair. Two examples include σist, the
elasticity of substitution between varieties assumed to be greater than 1, and γist, the
marginal cost of the labor input to retail production.
Proposition 1. The marginal effects of any retail market structure determinant vary
at the industry-state-year level in the non-asymptotic model of retail market structure
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in (3.1). This differs from the asymptotic equation governing retail market structure
in (1.7), which has constant and symmetric elasticities due to the log-log specification.
Proof: One way of showing this is by taking the partial derivative of (3.1) with
respect to any market structure determinant. Using L as a motivating example, this
partial derivative would be interpreted as the marginal change in the number of retail
establishments for a small change in the population (or market size), holding all other
variables constant. Let φist represent this partial derivative, reproduced below.
φist =
∂R∗
∂L
= [(αis(σist − 1)τstΩ)
∗ (2α2is(σist − 1)σist + k ((αisγistτstΩ)(1− σist)
+
√
αisγistτstΩ (4kL2σist + αis(σist − 1)(γist(σist − 1)τstΩ + 4Lσist)) + 2αisLσist))
∗
[
1
2(αis(σist − 1) + kL)2
√
αisγistτstΩ (4kL2σist + αis(σist − 1)(γist(σist − 1)τstΩ + 4Lσist))
]
(1.8)
Notice that the partial derivative (1.9) depends on variables that vary at the
industry, state and year levels. This contrasts with the elasticities resulting from
the asymptotic model, which are found by taking the partial derivative of (1.7) with
respect to a variable of interest.
Proposition 2. In the asymptotic approach as L→∞, the elasticity of retail estab-
lishment counts with respect to retail market structure determinants are symmetric
and constant.
Proof: Let R˜∗ represent the natural log of retail establishments, and x˜ represent
the natural log of determinant x. Take the partial derivative of (1.7) with respect to
any of the exogenous determinants gives either ±1
2
.
∂R˜∗
∂τ˜
=
1
2
∗ 1 = 1
2
(1.9)
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∂R˜∗
∂γ˜
= −1
2
∗ 1 = −1
2
(1.10)
which are constant and symmetric across industries.
From an econometric standpoint, the asymptotic result reduces the non-linear
equation governing retail establishment counts in (3.1) to a log separable candidate
specification. Distinguishing which model, asymptotic or unrestricted, best describes
the nature of competition between retail establishments can occur one of many ways.
Foremost, the asymptotic specification suggests that the elasticity of establishment
counts with respect to changes in the market structure determinants are constant
and symmetric across industries. If you can entertain the idea that it is economically
reasonable for industries to be differently sensitive to changes in establishment count
determinants, then you could reject the asymptotic result in favor of the unrestricted
result by finding evidence that effects vary across the retail industries represented in
the data.
Natural Oligopoly Result
The fact that R˜∗ is finite connects Eckel (2009) to Ellickson (2006) and Shaked and
Sutton (1983). In the former, the asymptotic number of retail firms, determined by
allowing the total revenue of retail firms to approach infinity, is also a finite number.
This result is the “natural oligopoly” outcome as described in Shaked and Sutton
(1983). My extension of the (Eckel, 2009) model in preceding discussion preserves
this bound on market structure in a model with constant returns in the retail industry.
This is not immediately intuitive, since the standard way of generating a bound to
fragmentation is through introducing retailers with increasing returns to scale. These
increasing returns can be generated for retail via endogenous fixed (sunk) costs as in
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Sutton (1991), or in a simple manner by adding a fixed labor cost like those facing
manufacturers.
The asymptotic approach of examining the retail market structure as labor grows
without bound is not immediately intuitive. In a symmetric approach, the increase
in L represents both a large population density in the home region as well as the
“foreign” regions that populate the Salop circle. In this sense, it is similar to the
market supply and demand conditions under perfect competition, since the number
of consumers in the world grows without bound. However, it differs from perfect
competition on account o the fragmentation bound allowing retailers to maintain a
positive price-cost margin.
Proposition 3. There exists a bound to retail market fragmentation in this model
with constant returns to scale in retail. with the bound being similar to the market
concentration lower bound as discussed in Sutton (1991). As markets grow (in revenue
terms), the number of retailers converges to a finite number as opposed to also growing
without bound.
Proof: There are two different ways of demonstrating this, one way is by taking
the limit of (3.20) with respect to L, which evaluates to zero after application of
L’Hospital’s rule. This suggests that in the limit the market structure in retail is
unresponsive to population growth, suggesting that all increased growth is absorbed
by incumbent establishments. This means the industry adjusts to internal growth
along an extensive margin like employment. A second way of demonstrating this
bound is showing the market structure equation itself has limiting behavior that does
not depend on L. This will be demonstrated in the section below in order to motivate
an estimating equation.
Why does this type of bound matter in practice? A bound on market concentration
suggests that there are “critical points” in the growth of the region beyond which all
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of the growth in demand is absorbed by incumbent firms. This means that firms
are adjusting along an extensive margin like employment, as is the typical story
in a short run investigation. If an econometric investigation is conducting a short-
run investigation, as might be done with panel data using large N and small T
asymptotics, this means that it is normal for there to be industries with insignificant
population effect estimates, since the retail establishments may be adjusting to the
growth with increased demand for labor as opposed to capital investment.
1.3 Empirical Investigation
1.3.1 Data
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for the 4 digit NAICS retail industries.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Establishments 784.7208 1165.2038 2 12251
Establishments per capita 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0008
Internet Access 62.0516 53.8532 0 769
Internet Use Intensity 51.7103 13.7055 24.4 85.6200
N 6885
Due to data availability constraints, the time period of the investigation is from
2008 until 2012. For this period, I construct a panel of all the 4 digit retail in-
dustries represented in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS
hereafter) across the 50 United States. For each panel, I collected the number of
establishments, employment count, and payroll within the industry-state pair in all
represented NAICS categories from the U.S. Census Statistics of U.S. Business. From
the descriptive statistics in (Table 3.1), a minimal value of 2 establishments in a 4
digit industry state pair come from “Other motor vehicle dealers” in the District
of Columbia. The retail industry group with the largest establishment count is the
“Clothing Store” industry in California. The extreme value for retail establishments
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per capita in this category implies that the most fragmented industry, i.e. that with
the most number of establishments per citizen, has approximately 1 establishment
for every 1250 people.
Dependent Variables
I use establishment counts as an absolute market structure measure, given by the
count of establishments in a given industry-state pair through time. Additionally, I
construct an “adjusted” market structure measure given by the establishment count
per capita Establishmentsist
Populationst
. Examples of both measures are provided in (Figure 1.4)
on p. 20, which plots the within industry-state variation in these measures for the
period of interest. Notice in (Figure 1.4) there is substantial within industry vari-
ation in both the absolute and adjusted market structure measures. Note the two
types of variation in this measure: there is across state variation, represented by how
each state’s time series in (Figure 1.4) has a different intercept, and within industry
heterogeneity, reflected by the variation in the establishment counts over time. The
“within” estimator I plan to use will discard the cross-sectional variation in favor of
the variation over time in order to identify the effects of varying Internet use intensity.
Additionally, I will explain the determinants of variation in employment counts
both across and within disaggregated retail industries. Observations of employment in
each industry-state-year triplet come from the Statistics of U.S. Business. Examples
of the variation in employment is plotted in (Figure 1.5) for NAICS 4512 “Books,
Periodicals, and Music Stores”. Notice that (Figure 1.5) also presents two types of
variation, across state variation s, and variation over time within each industry-state
pair. A fixed effects approach will only use the variation within each industry over
time to estimate the marginal effect of any variable of interest.
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Figure 1.4: Variation in retail market structure measures over time.
Independent Variables
The effect of interest is how variation in Internet use intensity influences retail es-
tablishment counts. I propose measuring Internet use along two dimensions, one
reflecting the extensiveness of Internet connectivity, another representing the inten-
sity with which consumers use the Internet. All previous research in the area use
less reliable survey data, which provide binary indicators of purchasing a good or ser-
vice online. For an extensive Internet use measure within a state (labeled “Internet
Access Rates” in the summary statistics), I combined the “Computer and Internet
Use Survey” from the Census with data from the National Telecommunications &
Information Administration (NTIA). Both of these sources provide state level data
for the percentage of households who report at least one individual using the Internet
from home. Finding state level measures for this variable for the year 2008 is proves
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Figure 1.5: Variation in retail employment counts over time.
difficult. Until remedied, I assume that the observations of this covariate for the year
2008 are approximated by the average of the values in given in 2009 and 2007.
Inspecting the histogram of Internet access across the states (Figure 3.9), there
is evidence for a high degree of heterogeneity in access rates across states as well
as substantial temporal variation in these access rates. These differences reflect het-
erogeneous telecommunications structures, varying Internet service provider market
conditions, and asymmetric preferences for Internet access across states. Mississippi
drags behind the rest of the states in this dimension, with the lowest access rates at
60.9%, far behind New Hampshire’s lead at ≈ 87%. Extensive measures alone do not
capture the dimensions along which the Internet can influence retail market struc-
ture. Consider two hypothetical adjacent states, both of which have a population of
1 Internet user with identical preferences with one exception: one of the two is not
savvy enough to use the Internet for shopping. Both would have the highest measure
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of Internet access rates (100%), yet would differ in how exposed their retail industries
are to e-commerce competition. Omitting propensity measures will bias estimates of
the marginal effect of Internet access upwards, since it is assumed the propensity to
use Internet is highly positively correlated with the access rates measure.
One can think of many reasons there is observed differences in this propensity
within and across states. Some geographical areas may have large groups of agents
who strongly prefer locally sourced and assembled goods more than supporting “for-
eign” products, and similar spatial clustering of preferences. Anecdotally, anyone
with older parents can attest to some sort of struggle or resistance regarding learning
to use the Internet. Clearly, states with relatively left skewed age distributions will
have effectively less intensity of Internet use, and therefore lower propensity to shop
online due a lack of familiarity with the procedures involved. I assume that the age
distributions of states is fixed in a short run investigation of this sort, and is therefore
captured by the fixed effects.
A suitable Internet propensity measure is uncorrelated with retail market structure
determinants while managing to capture variation in propensity to use the Internet.
Ideally, the measure would have negligible correlation with determinants of retail
market structure in order to mitigate both proxy variable bias and potential endo-
geneity from simultaneous/reverse causality. Additionally, the propensity measure
should have the goal of capturing the largest cross section of Internet users available.
With both of these caveats in mind, I use Google search frequency for the keyword
“pornography” at the state-year level meets these needs adequately since it captures
a vast cross-section of the population. I assume that anyone familiar enough with
the Internet for this explicit purpose is identically willing to shop online. The reader
may be concerned that this particular keyword introduces bias on account of 72%
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of visitors to pornography sites being male2. While the keyword may favor male
Internet activity, it is fair to assume that females in the state are just as able and
willing to use the Internet as their male counterparts. The alternative, that they are
any less propense to use the Internet, seems like an equally unlikely outcome. With
this assumption it is sufficient to adopt a measure that may place more weight on
the male population, since it reflects the propensity of both sexes to “hop online” to
accomplish tasks.
A second point of my investigation is to confirm that different industries should
be differently sensitive to varying Internet use intensity. There are industries that
should largely be insulated from e-commerce competition, primarily those for which
online shopping is a poor substitute or for which an online substitute fails to exist
for legal and practical reasons. For example, consider any effects of variation in an
intensive Internet use measure on the number of gasoline stations. Such an industry
should be perfectly isolated from online retail competition since there are no substi-
tutes available through online retailers, and furthermore it is illegal to ship flammable
liquids of this sort. Another example of a retail industry where domestic shipping
regulations preclude online is the “intoxicating liquors” industry, defined to be bever-
ages with 0.5% or more alcohol by volume, associated with the 4452XX industries. In
contrast to these examples, consider how the availability of news and online content
has shaped consumer purchasing habits in the periodicals segment. This industry
is in face-to-face competition with essentially homogeneous products provided online
that are easily accessed via smart phone for free, so it should be that this industry is
highly sensitive to variation in Internet propensity within a state. A later extension
will investigate this heterogeneity in detail, characterizing it in a more systematic
manner than ad hoc examples industry by industry.
2See http://www.familysafemedia.com/pornography statistics.html for this statistic and
similar
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I use SUSB data to construct wageis to proxy the parameter γ, which represented
the marginal labor cost of added variety. The constructed value is given by dividing
annual payroll in is by the employment in is. By assuming the asymptotic form of
R∗ I implicitly am saying that labor supply is extremely large. Since all markets clear
in an equilibrium, this would imply that labor demand is also large enough to meet
supply, which would approximate perfectly competitive labor market conditions. For
empirical purposes, it is assumed that labor markets are competitive and therefore
that wages identify marginal labor costs. This competitive labor market assumption
is a very realistic description of the retail industry as a whole, given that the average
job posting in the sector (outside of upper and middle management roles) tend to
have low education requirements3. Retail labor markets are characterized by an
abundance in supply due to the relatively lax qualifications required. If the study
was concerned with occupations outside of retail, take academia as an example, there
may be concern regarding negotiating power being reflected in wages. Retail is a broad
and relatively low-skill sector (reflected empirically in its low wages) to such a degree
that this assumption makes sense in the context of both retail labor markets and
retail as an industry. Since this is a short run investigation, I believe this assumption
is reasonable. In a long run investigation where the brick and mortar structure itself
is a variable input it would be possible to have capital be an adjustment margin for
added variety, though that is not in the interest of this investigation.
1.3.2 Model Specifications and Selection
In this section I will pit the structurally motivated log-log specification of market
structure against reduced form linear-linear and non-linear specifications in order
to determine which empirical model best approximates the “true” process governing
3BLS, http://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/retail-sales-workers.htm
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retail market structure. I take two approaches regarding selection, first using informa-
tion criteria based metrics like those in (Akaike, 1973), (Akaike, 1981) or (Takeuchi,
1976) when possible for model comparison. A naive approach would be to compare
the AIC of log-log specifications with the linear-linear and non-linear specifications,
which is not a best practice according to (Burnham and Anderson, 2002). For model
comparisons based on an information criteria, the response variables in the candidate
set must be measured in the same way. Further, since order of comparison does not
matter, I begin by determining the best of the log-log specifications using information
criteria. Then I determine the best among specifications with dependent variables en-
tering in levels (as opposed to log). The selection strategy is summarized graphically
in (Figure 3.12). I rely on a few strategies to compare models where the responses
are different measurements of the same variable and to supplement the formal infor-
mation criteria based approach. I perform a sequence of 10 fold cross validation trials
to compare out of sample of sample prediction accuracy.
Control Function Approach
In this section, I focus purely on the relationship between e-commerce and brick and
mortar retail. My strategy is to use relative search frequency for “amazon.com” at
Google within the state as a determinant of brick and mortar establishment and em-
ployment counts to proxy the intensity with which firms compete with e-commerce
substitutes. It’s likely the case that consumer willingness to substitute away from
local retail towards e-commerce is in part determined by factors which also act as
determinants of retail market structure. One example would be how there is po-
tential for small markets to be under-represented by retail variety, therefore making
e-commerce a popular option out of necessity and love for variety.
Recognizing this as a potential endogeneity problem, I propose the following con-
trol function approach and identification strategy to determining the relationship be-
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tween e-commerce and brick and mortar retail. I use within state variation in relative
search frequency for “porn” at Google as an instrument for within state variation in
the search frequency for “amazon.com”. Search frequency for “porn” certainly meets
the relevancy criteria of an ideal instrument since it measures the innate willingness
to hop online to accomplish a specific task. I also argue that the instrument is exclud-
able, since preference for pornography is likely a function of consumer characteristics
like religious sentiments and personal tastes, and is unlikely to share any time vary-
ing unobserved components with retail market structure. The first stage regression
appears in (1.11).
amazon intensityst = pi1porn intensityst +XstΠ + vist (1.11)
In (1.11) Xst is a (1 × 4) vector that includes the control variables for Internet
access rates, market size proxy, and wages along with a constant. Π is a (4 × 1)
vector of parameters to be estimated. Estimation results from from (1.11) appear in
(Table 3.5) in the appendix. The F-statistic from estimating (1.11) is ≈ 153, and
each instrument has a t-statistic much larger than 3, suggesting that the instruments
are not weak. I construct the residuals from (1.11) to create the control variable ˆvist.
The fixed effect specification in (1.18) is then augmented with the control variable
ˆvist from estimation of (1.11) to form the control function:
R∗ist = β
FEIV
i amazon intensityst︸ ︷︷ ︸
exposure effect * e-commerce intensity
+ ξvˆist︸︷︷︸
1st stage control var
+ XistΓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
exog. contol vars
+ (Θ + αis + λit + θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed effects
+ uist︸︷︷︸
idiosyncratic component
(1.12)
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Equation (1.12) is estimated with a fixed effect estimator to mitigate the effects
of time invariant confounding variables within each state. The fixed effects in (1.12)
effectively demean the observation first by the panel mean, then by the year mean, and
last by the industry-year mean. As such, any confounding effects must be varying at
the state or industry level through time. Econometrically, this approach is outlined
in (Matyas and Balzsi, 2013), (Baltagi et al., 2003), and (Baier and Bergstrand,
2007). The necessary identification assumptions are that the idiosyncratic errors uist
from (1.12) and the error in the reduced form in (1.11), vist, are orthogonal to the
exogenous controls in Xist as well as orthogonal to the instrument porn intensityst.
The estimate of ξ provides a way of testing for the endogeneity of e-commerce search
intensity via simple hypothesis tests.
Linear Models
For parsimony, I begin by estimating a specification similar to the asymptotic retail
market structure equation in (1.7). This equation suggests a regression of the natural
log of establishment counts on the natural log of various market structure determi-
nants, with constant marginal coefficients. For parsimony I start with a model of just
the time varying covariates without any fixed effects.
R˜∗ist = Θ˜ + β ˜net intensityst + X˜istΓ + uist (1.13)
In (1.13), R˜∗ist represents the log of the retail establishment count in industry-state
is for the year t. Since both the dependent and independent variables are in log form,
coefficient estimates are interpreted as elasticities. The effect of interest is β, the
elasticity of establishment counts with respect to the internet use intensity measure
net intensityst, holding all other measured variables like access rates and population
constant. Xist = (wageist, accessst, populationst) represents a 1 × 3 vector of control
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variables and Γst the associated 3× 1 vector of marginal effects motivated from (1.7).
The idiosyncratic “shock” uist represents represents the influence of all time varying
determinants of market structure that are not included as independent variables.
Further, since I have a dependent variable at the industry-state-year dimension, and
several independent variables only varying at the state-year dimension on the right
hand side, I bootstrap standard errors with clustering at the state level to address
the concerns in (Bertrand et al., 2004).
I introduce a new candidate model of market structure by generalizing (1.13) to
have slopes that are no longer fixed and identical across industries. The literature
refers to specifications of this sort by many names, including but not limited to
multilevel, hierarchical, random coefficient, and random slopes models. Adding this
feature allows for industry specific marginal effects, so that the Internet exposure
effect for gasoline stations need not be identical to the exposure effect for book stores.
In enriching the specification in this manner, I relax the assumption that marginal
effects are symmetric across industries, though symmetric marginal effects remains
nested as a possibility that can be tested via formal hypothesis tests. I add the
following model to the candidate set for the log-log specification and specifications
not yet introduced.
R˜∗ist = Θ˜ + βi ˜net intensityst + X˜istΓi + uist (1.14)
The multilevel specification is nearly identical to that of (1.13), with the exception
that the marginal effects are now indexed by industry i, reflecting the multilevel
characteristic of this specification. Symmetric marginal effects in (1.13) remain a
nested possibility in (1.14) that can be formally tested as the restriction β1 = β2 =
· · · = βN . A scatter of the fitted values versus the true establishment counts is
provided in (Figure 1.7). Notice that the residuals, as represented by the distance
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Figure 1.6: OLS log-log predicted versus observed scatter plot
between each point and the 45* line, have a relatively smaller variance than the simple
model in (1.13). This is expected on account of the fact that the simple model in
(1.13) presents 5 parameters to be estimated, while the multilevel approach raises
this to (4 independent variables × 27 industries) + 1 constant = 109 parameters to
be estimated, so naturally the model is able to fit the data with less error.
Of the 2 models compared I compare to a classical OLS specification, the largest
increase of explained variation comes from introducing multilevel effects. This can be
seen by the ≈ 48 percentage point increase in R2 in moving from column 1 to column
2 (Table 1.4).
A more credible approach for identification of the marginal effects would be to use
variation within each industry-state pair over time as opposed to explaining variation
across the industry-state pairs. Doing this eliminates any time invariant confounding
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factors, so any omitted variable bias must be from a source that varies over time.
Introducing fixed effects to build a within estimator will greatly increase the number
of parameters being estimated, though the strategy is identical to the time demeaning
procedure discussed in (Mundlak, 1978). This added number of parameters will work
against any model in an information criteria comparison due to the penalty mech-
anism, however the subsequent increase in the (log) likelihood of the model ought
to make up for the reduction in degrees of freedom. This leads me to adopt a fixed
effect specification where each panel is an industry-state pair, and is augmented with
industry, year, state, and industry-year fixed effects in addition to the panel fixed
effect
R˜∗ist =
(
Θ˜ + αis + λit + θt
)
+ βi ˜net intensityst + X˜istγi + uist (1.15)
A discussion of the appropriate differencing achieved with a model like (1.15) is
discussed in (Matyas and Balzsi, 2013). The presence of bilateral fixed effects stems
from the empirical trade literature, for instance in (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). The
first fixed effect in (1.15), αis is the individual effect for each panel, which absorbs
the average differences in time invariant unobserved and observed across across the
industry-state panels. A collection of dummy variables of this sort effectively does
the within panel transformation. This makes the empirical strategy such that any
confounding effects must be varying through time. To address this, I include all
combination of fixed effects that do not coincide with the dimension of my dependent
variables.
One of these is the year fixed effects θt accounts for macroeconomic factors common
to all industry state pairs in a given year, like that of generic decreases in aggregate
demand for retail products,or nationwide trends in Internet diffusion. In addition
to year fixed effects are the bilateral industry-year fixed effects λit, which captures
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Figure 1.7: OLS log-log multilevel predicted versus fit scatter
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issues that are specific to each industry across states in each period. For instance,
these fixed effects may capture industry technological progress if we believe that retail
R&D shocks are common to all locations where the industry operates. In the trade
literature, a parameter of this sort is assumed to capture the business cycle effects.
Error terms in the specification are given by uist and include the influence of factors
such as the consumer’s inter-variety substitution habits or other unobserved market
structure determinants which are idiosyncratic to both the industry-state and year
and assumed to be uncorrelated with the population, wages, Internet access, and
Internet use intensity measures.
Notice that in each fixed effects model, the slope coefficient is indexed by i, re-
flecting the multilevel characteristic of the panel models. I accomplish these industry
specific marginal effects by interacting the respective continuous variable with a set
of industry indicator variables. A specification of this sort is a form of generalized
linear models, as such OLS can be viewed as a restriction of the model such that each
industry has a symmetric response to changes in these variables. Since the data has
a large number of observations, I have the freedom to relax the symmetry restriction
and adopt a specification that allows for coefficient heterogeneity. By estimating in-
dustry specific coefficients, I allow for the data to provide evidence of a symmetric
response by industries to changes in market structure determinants.
Model selection metrics for all of the log-log specifications are provided in (Table
1.3) on page 33. Provided in this table are the Akaike information criteria, in addition
to an adjusted R2 measure. The table presents these measure from left to right in
order of increasing number of parameters. Of course, as parameters are added each
model will better fit the data, so to avoid overfitting I only include model selection
metrics that penalize added parameters. From this table, the classic OLS specification
without multilevel slope coefficients explains ≈ 58% of the variation in establishment
counts.
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Model/Features OLS log-log OLS log-log OLS log-log
Fixed Effects no no is, t,it
Multilevel Slope Coefficients no industry specific industry specific
# parameters 5 109 192
AIC 2.3 0.51 -2.97
Adj. R2 (R2) 0.582 (0.582) 0.936 (0.936) 0.998 (0.998)
10 fold
cross validation
avg. MSE
2635 2652 2618
Table 1.3: Selection metrics for log-log specifications.
Adding varying slope coefficients increases the fit of the model by explaining ≈
93% of the variation in establishment counts, an improvement over the classical OLS
specification of about 35 percentage points. Comparing this increase from constant to
varying slopes to the increase from adding fixed effects, the majority of the increase in
model fit is coming from relaxing the restrictive assumption of constant and identical
marginal effects across industries.
The candidate model achieving both the lowest value of the Akaike information
criteria, and the highest value of explained variation is the traditional panel fixed
effects model with industry specific slope coefficients. This model is able to explain
almost all of the variation in establishment counts, though this does not necessarily
translate to ideal out of sample predictive power. Whether this ordering holds in out
of sample prediction will be addressed using 10 fold cross validation.
I repeat this entire exercise using dependent and independent variables that enter
the specification as levels, as opposed to the log-log specification. I repeat the model
selection procedure with three candidate specifications: a classical OLS specification
without varying slope coefficients, a specification with varying slope coefficients (mul-
tilevel), and a model with fixed effects and varying slope coefficients. Each is listed
below, this time without the tildes to denote that the variables enter in levels.
R∗ist = Θ + β net intensityst +XistΓ + uist (1.16)
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Model/Features OLS linear-linear OLS linear-linear OLS linear-linear
Fixed Effects no no is, t, it
Multilevel Slope Coefficients no industry specific industry specific
# parameters 5 109 1467
AIC 16.3 14.3 10.8
Adj. R2 (R2) .454 (0.454) 0.930 (0.931) 0.998 (0.998)
10 fold
cross validation
avg. MSE
2570 2554 1340
Table 1.4: linear-linear model selection metrics
R∗ist = Θ + βi net intensityst +XistΓi + uist (1.17)
R∗ist = (Θ + αis + λit + θt) + βi net intensityst +XistΓi + uist (1.18)
A comparison of the fit of each of these linear models is provided in (Figure
1.8). In this figure, as you move from left to right and top to bottom the models are
increasing in generality from the classical OLS specification in (1.16) to the multilevel
panel specification in (1.18). Notice that the in sample errors improve greatly with
each added generalization, which can be seen by the decrease in spread from the 45
degree line. Formal model selection metrics are provided in (Table 1.4). Though the
panel fixed effects specification adds 14 times as many parameters to be estimated as
the next simplest model, the added increase in explained variation makes the panel
fixed effect specification an appealing candidate model.
Non-linear models
In this section, I take a reduced form approach of modeling retail establishment
counts with count data models, since many of the SUSB indicators are inherently
of this nature. The largest problem with using a traditional panel count data model
with fixed effects, as in the methods in Hausman et al. (1984) or Cameron and Trivedi
(2007) is the fact that fixed effects are are integrated out due to concerns regarding
inconsistent estimation of the slope parameters. An alternative approach uses an
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Figure 1.8: OLS linear-linear models predicted vs observed plot
unconditional strategy, as discussed in (Allison and Waterman, 2002), by estimating
the fixed effects that appear in the conditional mean. Linear approaches are also
not able to sufficiently capture the overdispersion that is present in the data. I use
this as an opportunity to show that my results are not being driven by the linearity
assumption.
An interesting pattern in the data is the presence varying degrees of dispersion in
the retail establishment counts for a given industry-state pair, as presented in (Figure
1.9). Dispersion is typically defined as the ratio of the dependent variable’s variance
to it’s mean within a group or panel. Notice that most of the extensive margins for
industry-state pairs are characterized by overdispersion. In the context of this model,
overdispersion refers to how the aforementioned variance seems to grow rapidly with
the within panel mean.
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Economically, overdispersion is a curious characteristic, since it implies that there
are characteristics of larger retail markets that provide an unstable environment for
retail firms to compete in, as if something churns in the shadows preventing a stable
equilibrium. Graphical evidence of this overdispersion is apparent in consideration
of (Figure 1.9). In this figure, notice that most of the observations fall above the
Meanis = V arianceis line, which is a 45 degree line that appears distorted since the
axes of this figure differ in scale. Overdispersion is a characteristic of the data on
which to begin the model selection process when comparing non-nested models before
doing more formal testing as in the methods discussed in (Vuong, 1989).
Consideration of overdispersion is important in selecting the proper econometric
models of retail market structure, since ignoring the influence of dispersion means that
the typical standard errors are not estimated correctly as explained in (McCullagh and
Nelder, 1989). A basic understanding of OLS and GLS estimators suggests that they
may not be able to replicate the overdispersion properties seen in the retail SUSB data.
This is on account of the fact that in a typical ordinary least squares specification (for
instance yi ∼ N(xTi β, σ2), the variance σ2 is estimated in a manner independent of
the mean function xTi β, and thus does not vary with the mean establishment count.
In order to improve on this shortcoming, I make an appeal to the negative binomial
regression technique, since in this specification the conditional mean enters directly in
the functional form of the conditional variance, explicitly allowing for overdispersion.
Less formal sources claim that count data far from zero can be treated like a con-
tinuous random variable, and that the only drawback to giving it the formal count
data treatment is ”computational intensity”. The ease of statistical software program-
ming and speed with which it executes no longer make “computational intensity” a
valid drawback of count data methods. By employing count data techniques, I hope
to be better able to better approximate the true data generating process for retail
establishment counts, a prominent feature of which includes the presence of overdis-
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Figure 1.9: Overdispersion in establishment count data
persion. The procedure of selecting an appropriate count data model comes with the
caveat that different integer distributions have different implications for the presence
of dispersion. For instance, a pure Poisson specification of the likelihood function
will present equidispersion since the mean of a Poisson distribution is identical to
its variance. Not accounting for overdispersion may yield inconsistent estimates and
grossly deflated standard errors as described in (Cameron and Trivedi, 2007).
Descriptive statistics in (Table 3.4) in the Appendix show that overdispersion is
a concern in the 4 digit NAICS County Business Pattern data. Pooling all industry-
state pairs, the average variance-to-mean ratio in the cross section of industry state
pairs (described in Table 3.4 in the) is 2.61 with a maximum of 97.3 occurring in
California’s “Electronic shopping and mail order houses” industry group. In this
cross-section, the minimal variance-to-mean ratio of 0 comes from the ”Lawn and
garden equipment” retail industry in the District of Columbia.
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For a formal specification, let yist represent the market structure for industry-state
is in year t. I introduce the same candidate models as the previous section, starting
with a simple specification absent of persistent effects, then introduce across-industry
heterogeneity in slope coefficients, followed by a specification with (industry, state,
year) fixed effects, and last a traditional panel specification with (industry-state, year)
fixed effects:
yist ∼ Negative Binomial(αe
βnet intensityst+XistΓ
1 + αe
,
1
α
) (1.19)
yist ∼ Negative Binomial( αe
βinet intensityst+XistΓi
1 + αeβinet intensityst+XistΓi
,
1
α
) (1.20)
yist ∼ Negative Binomial( αe
βinet intensityst+XistΓ+αis+λit+θt
1 + αeβinet intensityst+XistΓ+αis+λit+θt
,
1
α
) (1.21)
The given parameterization in (1.21) gives
The parameter α, to be estimated, is associated with overdispersion evident in
(Figure 1.9). If α = 0, then the conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance
and there is equidispersion. For α > 0, there is evidence of overdispersion. Notice
that this specification may do a better job of replicating the overdispersion pattern
since the mean function eXistβ+αis+λit+θt appears directly in the functional form of the
conditional variance. It is worth noting that marginal effects are slightly different
in a negative binomial setup than in a linear regression. The marginal effects are
proportional to and share the sign of each slope parameter. Each model is estimated
with robust standard errors clustered at the state level since the variance is inherently
heteroskedastic on account of it being a function of the covariates Xist, and are not
necessarily independent across industries in the same state.
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Model/Features neg. binomial 1 neg. binomial 2
neg.
binomial 4
Fixed Effects no no is,t,it
Multilevel Slope Coefficients no industry specific industry specific
# parameters 6 110 1468
AIC 14.6 13.7 9.00
McFadden Adj. R2 .045 .110 0.41
10 fold
cross validation
avg. MSE
4402 3982 2517
Table 1.5: Negative Binomial model selection metrics
Formal model selection metrics for comparing the negative binomial models are
presented in (Table 1.5). Note that the negative binomial model with panel fixed
effects is an ideal candidate according to a comparison made on Akaike information
criteria, as well as the crude comparison based on adjusted R2. Following the selection
strategy outlined in (Figure 3.12) in the Appendix, I compare the best of the linear
in parameters models to the best non-linear model based on a 10 fold cross validation
comparison. I find the following stylized facts:
Proposition 4. Of the candidate models comparable by information criteria mea-
sures, the negative binomial specification (1.21) is the ideal candidate.
Through a cross-validation comparison with (1.15), I find that the models only
differ by a few units of mean squared error in the average across a sequence of 10
fold cross validation trials. This suggests that count data strategies yield a small
but significant advantage in out of sample forecasting. Likewise, when comparing the
ability of the various models to match various moments in the data, as is done in
(Table 3.4) and (Table 3.3) in the Appendix, I find that the negative binomial models
are better able to replicate the extreme statistics and variance of the data.
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1.3.3 Results
Control Function Results
The first stage results of regressing “amazon.com” search frequency on “porn” search
frequency along with the exogenous control variables gives the control function in
(1.23).
vˆist = amazon search intensityst
− E(amazon search intensityst|porn search intensityst, Xist)
= amazon search intensityst − (0.095
(7.82)
porn search intensityst +XistΠˆ)
(1.23)
where
Xist = (net accessst, populationst, wagest, pi0)
Πˆ = (0.013
(7.37)
, .0000004
(23.20)
, .0551
(3.69)
, 32.87
(36.62)
)
The t-statistic of the first stage parameter estimate appears in parenthesis below
the estimate.This is used in the estimation of (1.12) via fixed effects instrumental
variables (FEIV) in order to produce estimates of the βFEIVi .
At the 4 digit NAICS level there are 27 categories that classify retail, with each
of the 27 having an amazon exposure effect ˆβFEIVi < 0 at the 95% confidence level.
The graph in (Figure 1.10) presents the βFEIVi with the NAICS category running
on the horizontal axis and the point estimate running along the vertical axis. Ex-
amining (Figure 1.10), a clear pattern appears: increasing relative search frequency
for “amazon.com” within the state is associated with net exit in all retail categories.
This pattern does not exclude electronic shopping and mail order houses, which shows
that Amazon is a competitive threat within the domain that is e-commerce. The exit
40
pattern extends to industries like gasoline retail that should be insulated from direct
e-commerce competition, yet depend on the e-commerce habits in an indirect manner.
The mechanism goes as such: an increase in consumer e-commerce intensity means
that the consumer is able to substitute away from local retail in favor of e-commerce
and therefore demands less gasoline to travel the distance to a retailer.
Repeating the exercise by replacing establishment counts with employment counts
does not yield significant result. This null results is robust in the sense that it occurs
for the 27 industries at the 4 digit NAICS level. Many things could explain this
insignificant result, including but not limited to the efficiency of an IV/control func-
tion approach, insufficient variation in the first place, a small or negligible effect, or
another margin of adjustment. In this last case, I suggest that there is the possibility
that e-commerce has made retail employers use their existing employee stock in ways
that are more efficient for the firm and not necessarily for the employee. A first exam-
ple would be to lower working hours allotted per employee. Another more anecdotal
example of this would be the dynamic scheduling system that many retailers use to
schedule part time employees, which anecdotally provides little consistency in work
time from week to week and changes the mix of full time to part time employees in the
process. This inconsistency can make holding multiple part time jobs simultaneously
an added challenge.
An adjustment of worker hours can be indirectly tested by replacing the left hand
side in (1.23) with annual payroll in each panel-year ist. Results from this appear in
(Figure 1.11). For the 27 retail industries represented at the 4 digit NAICS level, I
estimate 19 negative industry effects and 8 insignificant effects, presented in (Figure
1.11) as a function of average operating expenses within the industry. This suggests
that the variation in e-commerce intensity has a highly significant and negative effect
on retail payroll. If you combine these two facts, that e-commerce intensity brings
41
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Figure 1.10: Graphical representation of e-commerce establishment count exposure
effect
exit in retail, no changes in employment levels, and consistent decreases in payroll, it
speaks to the evidence of quality escalation in retail.
Market Structure Results
Estimating a multilevel model gives a breadth of results that doesn’t give appealing
way of presenting a table of results due to the fact that now, there as many partial
effects for a single independent variable as there are groups over which the effect is
allowed to vary. A graphical representation of the estimates makes for a much better
presentation of the across industry heterogeneity in sensitivity to changes in Internet
use intensity, as is presented in (Figure 1.12). This bubble graph has the NAICS
index running on the horizontal axis, and the point estimate of the industry Internet
use intensity coefficient βi given by the vertical axis coordinate of the midpoint of
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Figure 1.11: Graphical representation of e-commerce payroll exposure effect
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Figure 1.12: Graphical representation of Internet exposure effect in non-linear models.
the bubble. Since NAICS is a categorical variable with a nested structure, there is
little meaning to the values or order of appearance on the horizontal axis, outside the
fact that industries that share the same first 3 digits may have some characteristics
in common. Each bubble’s area is proportional to its representative share of total
employment in the 44-45 digit retail categories. (Figure 1.12) gives a striking rep-
resentation of the asymmetry across industries to changes in Internet use intensity,
which I discuss in further detail below.
A first glance at the Internet exposure results in (Figure 3.13) show a few patterns
in the results. One of the most apparent is the across industry heterogeneity in the
exposure to Internet use, made evident by the differences in the center of each bubble.
This heterogeneity provides justification for the multilevel approach of estimating
industry-specific slope parameters. On its own, adding varying slope coefficients
increases the explained variation in establishment counts by 35-48 percentage points,
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as seen in (Table 1.3) and (Table1.4). The alternative approach, a symmetric marginal
effect for all industries, biases the true effect for each industry by presenting only a
single parameter estimate that is a weighted average of effects across industries.
It is reasonable to expect that the effect of increased Internet use intensity will be
different across retail industries. Not all NAICS categories are as “exposed” as others,
in the sense that online shopping is not as easily substitutable for brick and mortar
retail. Take grocery stores (NAICS 4451) as an example. Grocers combine labor and
distribution in combination with food products to produce the final food products we
browse for consumption. This is a retail segment with product substitutes that are
not as readily available online in most locales due to the challenges associated with
shipping fresh products that cannot be frozen. It is difficult to imagine that Internet
retailers of fresh foods are able to compete against brick and mortar grocers, since
the cost of refrigerated shipping is likely to be prohibitive. Furthermore, brick and
mortar retail chains develop highly efficient distribution networks, giving them a cost
advantage over fringe competitors. Rather, proliferation of the Internet has changed
the competition in this industry by allowing consumers to observe prices at a lower
cost. So it is more likely that intensive Internet use should help grocery retailers that
are highly efficient at the cost of inefficient firms. (Figure 1.12) shows that grocers
were among the many industries that experience pressure for entry with increasing
Internet use intensity. With firms like Shipt entering and introducing online grocery
ordering systems, some regions currently do have a way to substitute away from
visiting a physical grocery store. Revenue still passes through to the store, so these
firms really just weigh your opportunity cost of time against the added delivery fee.
Leading the set of industries that derive harm from variation in Internet use
intensity are those represented by NAICS 4512, which consists of Book Stores, Music
Stores, and News Dealers. Perhaps the most common characteristic of establishments
in this industry is how the Internet allows near costless distribution of their products.
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Periodical vendors are in closer competition with Internet substitutes than any other
retail segment on account of the ease and near zero cost of acquiring news online. This
effect obviously is amplified with the proliferation of cell phones, in that cell phones
have given us the ability to find free news in our pocket nearly anywhere during
our day to day business, including times we formerly dedicated to visiting the news
stand. Similar logic applies to book retailers from the substitution toward electronic
devices to read e-books purchased online. Thus, as a state’s citizens use the Internet
with more intensity, there is a substitution away from the products offered in this
retail segment, driving away profits and forcing exit of establishments. Furthermore,
the ease of finding pirated copies of books and music make the Internet even more
of a threat to establishments in this segment. It’s hard to think of a more topical
example of how the Internet has caused retail industrial “churning” than to look at
book, periodical, and music stores. Many other industries that would be expected
to feel the pinch of consolidation from increased Internet use intensity actually do
consolidate.
It is little surprise that many industries with highly tradable products already of-
fered by big e-commerce retailers like Amazon have negative point estimates. These
include florists (4531), office supplies (4532), specialty foods, as well as the catch all
“other miscellaneous store retailers” (4539) that are likely to be in direct competi-
tion with Amazon and similar online retailers. Department stores have the second
largest share of employment in the represented NAICS retail industries and also had a
point estimate with a negative sign, suggesting exit by establishments in this category
with increasing Internet use intensity.Another capacity in which the Internet serves
consumers is a matching mechanism, particularly in the markets for used goods like
automobiles. The results in (Figure 1.12) suggest that used automobile dealers expe-
rience a net exit with increased Internet use intensity, which is of little surprise when
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you consider the plethora of sites that match used car owners to potential buyers
(eBay and Craigslist being prime examples).
Employment Results
I duplicate the entire model selection procedure discussed above replacing establish-
ment counts with employment counts. With this outcome variable, there is little
guidance for an ideal econometric specification as was the case with establishment
counts. Equilibrium in the labor market is characterized by an intimidating looking
polynomial, given by (3.19) in the Appendix. Unlike the establishment count results,
there is no structural motivation for the equation governing labor. Various selection
metrics across the best of the log-log, linear-linear, and negative binomial specifica-
tions appear in (Table 1.6). I cannot do selection based on comparing AIC across all
the candidate models, since they differ in their measurement of the same dependent
variable. All the models have extremely similar and high adjusted R2 values, pre-
sumably on account of the large number of parameters fit by each model. I default
to selecting an ideal candidate based on out of sample prediction powers through a
sequence of 10 fold cross validation trials. Using this selection metric leads me to
choosing the negative binomial specification, since it has the lowest out of sample
prediction errors.
Graphical representation of the estimation results appear in (Figure 1.13). Inter-
pretation of this graph is the same as in the market structure results, the midpoint of
each bubble corresponds to both a NAICS category on the horizontal axis and a point
estimate on the vertical axis. Note that marginal effects in a count data regression do
not coincide with the coefficient estimates themselves, however marginal effects are
proportional to the coefficient estimates and share the same sign. The employment
count results share many patterns with the market structure results. There is a high
degree of heterogeneity in employment results, represented by the occurrence of point
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Model/Features log-log spec linear-linear spec negative binomial spec
Fixed Effects is, t is, t, it is, t, it
Slope Coefficients industry specific industry specific industry specific
# parameters 1466 1601 1467
AIC -2.1 (not comparable) 17.4 14.4
Adj. R2 .997 .996 0.998
10 fold
cross validation
avg. MSE
37560 35491 37454
Table 1.6: Employment specification selection metrics
estimates above and below the origin. Of the 27 industries represented at the 4 digit
NAICS level, 9 experience relatively increased employment with higher Internet use
intensity, and 11 experience a relative decrease in employment with increased Internet
use intensity, leaving 7 industries with an effect indistinguishable from zero.
With greater Internet use intensity comes not only potential threat from e-commerce,
but more direct matching of buyers and sellers without a retail middleman. Substi-
tution away from used automobile dealers is evident both in the negative effect on
establishment counts and the subsequent decrease in employment seen in (Figure
1.13). Exit by retail establishments implies decreased employment at that establish-
ment. Whether the workers substitute for retail within the industry, in a another
retail industry, or in a different industrial sector altogether is highly specific to each
individual and market.
Similar to the market structure results of the previous section, the pinch from
e-commerce is evident within retail industries with highly tradeable products. With
the near zero cost and ease of transmitting and copying digital music and books,
it is little surprise to see that the exit in NAICS 4512 (Books, Periodicals, Music
Stores) is associated with a reduction in employment within this category. Once
again, establishments in this category have employees whose jobs are more exposed
to the Internet than any other industry represented in the SUSB.
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Figure 1.13: Graphical representation of Internet exposure effect on employment
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Second Level Analysis
In this section, I explain the across industry heterogeneity in Internet exposure effects
by examining their partial correlations with various retail characteristics for which
data are available at the industry level. Since the dependent variable in this investiga-
tion is an industry specific marginal effect that varies only on the industry dimension,
all independent variables must also vary on the industry dimension. The census pro-
vides the Annual Retail Trade Survey, which provides measures of operating costs
and margins at the 4 digit NAICS level for retail industries. I use linear regression
with a bootstrap procedure to estimate standard errors in order to non-parametrically
estimate the expectation of the Internet exposure effect, conditional on an industrial
characteristic:
E(βi|characteristici) = α + φcharacteristici
One prime characteristic would be the share of non-tradable inputs in retail out-
put. Using the 2007 SUSB data, I can approximate this for each industry by taking
the ratio of payroll to receipts within each industry state, and then averaging over
states. Specifically, Let nontis =
Payrollist
Receiptsi,s,t
for all industry state pairs is. I aggregate
nontis to the industry level nonti by taking the industry average across states.
nonti =
1
50
∑
s∈S
nontis (1.24)
I hypothesize that retail industries with goods that have inputs which are largely
non-tradable are relatively more insulated from e-commerce competition. Unfortu-
nately there is not a large amount of variation across industries in this proxy that
measures the share of the non-traded inputs in retail. This is made evident by in-
specting (Figure 1.14). Examples of such industries include gasoline and alcohol retail,
both of which are prohibited for domestic shipment. In the same manner, retailers
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Figure 1.14: Labor input share of receipts histogram
of quickly perishable products cannot ship their products in a cost effective manner.
For a crude measure of product tradability, I generate an indicator variable that takes
the value of one for retail industries that purvey goods on the “Standard Prohibited
and Restricted Items” list of the United States Postal Service. At the 4 digit NAICS
level, there are only 4 of 27 industries that have items in these categories, which I
suspect will be insufficient variation to detect an effect.
Another possible determinant of Internet exposure is the degree to which fixed/sunk
costs are requisites for competing in the retail segment. Establishing an e-commerce
business is relatively easier when these expenses are low and when the Internet al-
lows for a decrease in distribution costs, as discussed in (Peitz et al., 2012). Thus,
retail industries with relatively low distributive expenses (a component of operating
expenses) face the largest threat by entrants. The Census provides annual data on
operating expenses for the majority of 4 digit NAICS retail industries. I use this data
to construct a “relative operating expense” measure, defined as the average operating
expense in industry j relative to operating expenses for electronic shopping retail-
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ers: relative operating expensesj =
E(operating expensesj)
E(operating expenseselectronic)
. I would expect that as
relative operating expenses increase for an industry, that there are greater barriers
to entering as an e-commerce competitor, leading to a higher degree of insulation
from e-commerce and relatively lower Internet exposure. I supplement this with the
average operating expense, defined to be the average of the operating expenses within
each industry for the sample period 2008-2012.
Last, since profit is an ultimate motive for entry in a retail segment, I included the
gross margin as a possible determinant of industry Internet exposure via the entry
incentive that profit margins may represent. From an account perspective, gross
margins are revenues minus cost of good sold. Thus gross margins provide an upper
bound to the profits the establishments in that industry can realize, since some of the
margins must be allocated to capital, labor, marketing costs, etc. I like to consider
it from the perspective of entrepreneurs that represent the competitive fringe. The
lower the gross margin, the lower the potential profit margin, the less attractive the
industry is for potential entrant firms.
E(βi|restricted shippingi) = α + φ ∗ restricted shippingi
E(βi|nonti) = α + φ ∗ nonti
E(βi|relative operating expensesi) = α + φ ∗ relative operating expensesi
E(βi|average operating expensesi) = α + φ ∗ average operating expensesi
E(βi|proft margini) = α + φ ∗ profit margini
(1.25)
Results of estimating the partial effect of restricted shipping, increased operating
cost, and average margins on Internet exposure estimates are presented in (Table 1.7).
The restricted shipping indicator is not statistically different from zero, presumably
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exposure βi exposureβi exposure βi
restricted shippingi -0.00005
(0.03)
relative operating expensesi 0.00246
(2.16)*
profit margini -0.00005
(1.20)
cons (α) -0.00059 -0.00211 0.00126
(0.96) (2.82)** (0.83)
R2 0.00 0.18 0.03
N 27 26 27
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Table 1.7: Second level analysis regression results
from insufficient variation. The relative operating expenses carries a positive sign, sug-
gesting that industries with relatively large operating expenses derived a relatively
larger benefit from variation in Internet use intensity. Across industry differences
in relative operating expenses explained about 18% of the industry heterogeneity in
Internet exposure. Economically this result is significant since it this means that Av-
erage profit margins were not statistically significant as determinants of the Internet
exposure effect.
Focusing on the determinants of the e-commerce exposure effect, I plot the ˆBFEIVi
as a function of average operating expenses in (Figure 1.15) and (Figure 1.16). Both
of these graphs show a positive relationship between the establishment or payroll
e-commerce exposure and the average operating expense within the industry. Each
of these graphs is strong empirical evidence that industries with low overhead are in
closest competition with e-commerce , while the largest industries may be insulated
or sufficiently adapted.
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Figure 1.15: Second level analysis of e-commerce establishment count exposure effect
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Figure 1.16: Second level analysis of e-commerce payroll exposure effect
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1.4 Conclusions
In summary, this paper investigates the ambivalent relationship between the Internet
and retail establishment and employment counts. I developed a spatial model of retail
competition to motivate the features of an ideal econometric specification explaining
entry and exit in retail. The effect of interest was the degree to which increased
Internet use intensity is associated with entry and exit in retail, and the correspond-
ing fluctuations in retail employment. Exogenous variation in consumer Internet use
intensity was measured using relative search frequency for “porn” at Google, which
proxies the propensity of a state’s citizens to hop online to accomplish tasks. I used
this measure both on its own and as an instrument for e-commerce intensity, measured
by frequency of searches for “amazon.com”. From my model selection procedures, I
demonstrated that reduced form specifications are more effective than the structurally
motivated estimating equation. This did not invalidate the structural model I devel-
oped since it prescribed the use of a multilevel model that drastically improves the fit
of empirical models and prevents biased inference. After model selection, estimation
results suggested that there is a high degree of heterogeneity across retail industries
in the relative help or hindrance provided by the Internet. Naturally, some retail
industries were more insulated than others from these changes, and the consistency
of this isolation helped validate the results as a whole. The empirical observation
that industries are differently sensitive to changes in consumer mobility was explored
by allowing for the Internet use intensity coefficients to be industry specific, allowing
a secondary analysis to characterize the coefficient heterogeneity.
The first immediate extension that I believe is fruitful is to investigate further
use of the Google search intensity data. Google’s interface allows for one to retrieve
search intensity for any keyword provided it is sufficiently popular. It must have a
small and unspecified amount of search volume to be reported in the first place, so it’s
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best not to get too specific. Investigating the sharing economy that has sprung up in
recent years could be another avenue for research. For instance, I could just as easily
use the Statistics of U.S. Business or County Business Pattern data to explore the
connection between consumer sentiments for ride sharing through Uber or Lyft, and
attempt to detect any subsequent effect on the traditionally licensed transportation
service industries.
Future empirical investigation in this work should focus on the relationship be-
tween retail and population growth. Most coefficients on population measures were
not different from zero, suggesting that most retail industries do not adjust to pop-
ulation growth by opening new establishments. The robustness of the insignificant
internal growth result from the econometric investigation leads me to believe that the
population-market structure marginal effect has the appropriate sign. It must be the
case that many industries are approaching the market fragmentation bound so that
the majority of growth is being absorbed on intensive margins instead of on exten-
sive margins (entry/exit). Anecdotally, it seems to be the case that there are critical
points in the growth of a city beyond which big box retailers like Ikea or Walmart are
enticed to open shop. It is entirely possible that when these large retailers open, they
put several small retailers out of business. If this is the case, then looking at changes
in the establishment count may not be the appropriate margin of adjustment in the
retail industry, and we should also expect our estimates of the partial correlation
between population and establishment counts to be null or negative.
There are multiple natural extensions to the theoretical side of this line of research.
At some point in future work with this model, I should consider the role of endogenous
fixed costs as in Sutton (1991). Retailing’s comparative advantage as an industry is
distribution and the incorporation of local inputs into the production process that
transforms manufacturer’s intermediates into the finished product we see on shelves.
There is little doubt the distribution associated capital and physical brick and mortar
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components are not exogenously given, but rather depend critically on the optimal
choice of variety. The constant return cost structure of retailers in (Eckel, 2009)
and my extension completely ignore the role of fixed costs. Usually, a bound to
market fragmentation like that found in my contribution are generated through these
endogenous fixed cost structures. Thus, it is worthwhile to develop a dynamic model
in order to allow for fixed cost decisions in one period to influence cost and revenue
functions in later periods.
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CHAPTER 2
REGIONAL EFFECTS OF INDUSTRY PRIVATIZATION: EVIDENCE
FROM THE SPACE COAST AND THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
I investigate the regional response to the sectoral shock of discontinuing the public
provision of space transportation. The shock manifests as a large negative labor
and capital demand shock to the highly specialized “allied” industries that provide
inputs to the Shuttle program. In light of retiring the Shuttle fleet, there are many
pertinent regional questions that must be addressed. Should there be an expectation
that specialized labor will “chase industry” outside the region? Will there be entry
by specialized firms to take advantage of the relative abundance of the specialized
capital and labor?
These questions and their answers are important for many reasons, since they have
real implications for regional income and the subsequent multiplier effect on regional
business. A thorough understanding of the answers will aid in the prescription of mu-
nicipal policy in the region to ameliorate the transition to a new steady state for the
region experiencing the shock. Considering the transmission mechanism of the priva-
tization is a prerequisite for prescribing policy, since the optimal response obviously
hinges on the dimensions in which the county responds to the “shock” of discontinued
funding of the STS (Space Transportation System) program. I will investigate the
response of employment, unemployment, payroll, and establishment counts to the dis-
continuation in public provision of space transportation via a difference-in-difference
econometric investigation.
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I make many contributions to the understanding of regional factor demand shocks
with this investigation. First, the quasi-experimental nature of the discontinuation
of the space program allows for clean identification of the regional response to factor
demand shocks in the form of layoffs in many high productivity aerospace related
contracting firms. It is the first in the literature to rely on a policy shock for iden-
tification of regional labor allocation and industrial composition responses. Thus,
identification of the shock does not rely on the strength of my belief on whether an
instrument is relevant and excludable. Secondly, the investigation allows for analysis
of the privatization of monopolized industry in a market economy, which contrasts
many previous studies of privatization in economies emerging from central planning.
This is important in its own right since it allows for a view of privatization in a context
where results will not be confounded with the institutional and oversight problems
associated with economies in transition. Lastly, the idea of a regional response to
privatization seems to be largely glossed over by the literature, in part since the lit-
erature focuses on the response in more disaggregated economic units like individual
firms and their competitors as opposed to a slightly more macroeconomics focus on
the regions and the industries they support.
I proceed by giving a brief introduction to the space program so the reader can
understand why Florida’s Space Coast was host to the program in the first place, the
relative importance of the space program in the regional economy, and the nature of
the decision to retire the Shuttle fleet and transition. With a clear understanding of
the space program and the context of the investigation, I describe my data and the
econometric investigation I will conduct. The majority of my results will be presented
in a graphical format, since this is more appealing than staring at a table with 90
results for each dependent variable. Finally, I estimate the aggregate effects, discuss
the implied counterfactuals, and attempt to characterize the industry heterogeneity
in shock responses in a systematic manner.
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2.1.2 Space Program Background
“Conventional wisdom” in the Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of
the US Space Program gives two clear policy goals for the Shuttle program: increased
access to space (goal 1) at a reduced cost (goal 2) (Pielke, 1993). The STS program
is viewed as failing to achieve these goals for three reasons, two of which are financial
with the third being a suboptimal favoring of short term fixes at the cost of “longer
range implications” (a failure of dynamic programming). Much of the criticism stems
from poorly formed expectations regarding the capabilities of the shuttle program at
the outset. As an example, early cost estimates assumed that the program would
reach 50 launches a year in order to minimize the average cost per launch. The
Challenger disaster struck in 1986, only one year after the busiest launch calendar in
program history with 9 launches in 1985. The Columbia disaster (STS-107 re-entry,
2003) warranted some time to review procedures and re-invest in the safety of the
program. These disasters were a sufficient demonstration that the program and its
ageing fleet would not be able to meet the grueling expectations originally outlined.
It is reasonable to question why was the east coast of Florida chosen to be host
in the first place? Due to the bureaucracy behind such a choice, selection of the
host county for the program was determined by many observable strategic factors,
and is therefore not a random occurrence. According to (Matson, 2009), there were
2 key criteria in determining where to optimally operate the space program: safety
and launch efficiency. In order to take advantage of the earth’s momentum, Shuttles
would need to travel east. By launching from the east coast and traveling east over the
Atlantic ocean, the chances of any operational disasters harming humans and property
on the surface of earth were minimized. Additionally, the launch location needed to
be as close to the equator as possible for launch efficiency. The linear velocity of the
earth’s rotation increases as you head toward the equator. NASA uses this velocity
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to its advantage to save on fuel, and desired a location as far south on the coastline as
possible . To this degree, Cape Canaveral is relatively far south: Florida accounts for
roughly 28% of the nation’s Atlantic coastline. This makes Brevard county further
south than 86% (rough approximation) of the nation’s Atlantic coastline, which I
feel comfortable calling “relatively far south.” In addition to being in proximity to
army and naval bases, 1940s Brevard was mainly composed of orange groves, so the
population was not very dense, simultaneously satisfying the safety condition. All of
these factors in combination made Cape Canaveral (and therefore Brevard County)
the most competitive candidate for locating launch operations.
In order to fully understand the economic impact of such a shock I will briefly
describe the context and economic relevancy of the program in the regional economy.
STS had a budget that was large relative to estimates of the county’s GDP. The STS
budget fluctuated between 3.8 (2010) and 5.6 (2005) billion (in 2010 dollars), com-
pared to the estimated 18 billion dollar Brevard County GDP(E.D.C., 2010). There
is no clear way of discerning how much of this budget was dedicated to operations in
the space coast. Cape Canaveral was the host to every launch for the duration of the
STS program. This is despite there being a launch pad at Vandenberg Air Force Base
in California and many STS landings at Edwards Air Force Base (California). There
is little doubt that Brevard had the largest amount of space infrastructure in em-
ployment for STS, and also benefited the most from the tourism spillovers associated
with being host to the program since it was the exclusive launch host for the entirety
of the program. Since it is not possible to attribute the amount of the STS budget
devoted to activities within Brevard County, I elect to use the standard binary treat-
ment indicator in the difference in difference specification, which is discussed further
below.
Using data from (Pielke, 1993) I was able to construct a graph of the running
average cost per launch in (Figure 2.1). For any year t on the horizontal axis of this
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graph, the vertical axis measures the cumulative sum of the STS budget until that year
divided by the cumulative number of launches including that year. This is therefore
a graph of the running average cost per launch for the STS program. The “trend”
in (Figure 2.1) is a period of decreasing average costs from the start of the program
until the year before the Challenger disaster. The disaster prompted significant re-
investment focused on assessing safety procedures, along with a reduction in the
expected number of launches per year. A similar “bump” in the average cost function
is observed around the time of the Columbia disaster in 2003. From a pure cost-
benefit standpoint, it is rational that our efforts to reach space make the transition
to a private setting. (Figure 2.1) clearly shows the aging STS system has exhausted
economies of scale, made evident by reaching a low point on the average cost curve.
Further investment would prolong the life of aging technology at a great financial and
risk management costs. Though it is not always desirable to extrapolate far from the
sample data, there is a belief that continued launches will drive the average cost curve
in (Figure 2.1 further uphill. Rather than take this avenue, our nation acknowledges
that the need for updated space transportation at higher safety standards and lower
costs comes with a new transition to privatization of space travel, justifying the 2004
mandate to discontinue STS.
There are several dimensions along which Florida’s Space Coast can respond to
the shock of discontinuing STS launches. Employers like Boeing and the United
Space Alliance (USpA), who are associated with highly specialized mechanical and
aerospace engineering pools, were forced to lay off thousands of specialized workers.
Ceteris paribus, the effects of a layoff episode of this sort would decrease the income
of the region, and subsequently decrease the demand for goods and services. If the
shock is permanent, there is an implication for local market structure, since the
market would be temporarily saturated, in turn leading to pressure on the least
efficient firms. At the same time as experiencing thinning labor markets, there are
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large stocks of highly specific and immobile capital associated with the production
of air and space transportation equipment. Equipment like engine testing facilities,
launch pads, and assembly buildings, all face potential lack of employment. The
immobility of this capital combined with the relative abundance of high productivity
labor and geographical desirability makes Brevard an attractive choice for firms in
industries that could use the labor networks and aerospace infrastructure.
To determine the appropriate data to work with, I first consider the possible mar-
gins of adjustment and the time frame in which each is fixed and variable. Foremost,
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it’s possible that the county would see a flight of labor to jobs outside the county or
state. In a worse case scenario, this happens and the resulting lack of consumption
spending in the region leads to an “aftershock” of businesses closing due to a lack
of revenues to meet their break-even. In a more positive counterfactual world, we
would see firms from outside the county/region acting opportunistically in regards
to the large stocks of capital and labor experiencing unemployment, and therefore
relocating to Brevard to help ease the layoff effects.
2.1.3 Related Literature
The effects of privatizing individual firms within an industry have been thoroughly
investigated. There seems to be little literature regarding privatizing entire industries,
where the industry generates revenue from public provision, perhaps on account of
how few examples of such situations exist. Existing literature also seems to focus on
allocative efficiency and cost improvements, and seem to neglect the regional economic
perspective on the consequences of such a decision. With this in mind, this chapter
intends to understand (i) how the region supporting the formerly public industry/firm
responds to this type of shock and (ii) how will firms across all industries behave in
the presence of this type of shock (iii) how does industrial composition change in light
of shock. The purpose of doing such an investigation is to understand the economic
transmission of the shock through the regional economy to motivate future policies
when faced with similar circumstances.
My empirical strategy relies on a ”natural experiment” resulting from a policy
specific policy shock, with methodology similar to the approach in (Card, 1990).
In the case of discontinued funding of the STS program, the shock presents as a
large negative demand shock in the labor and capital markets. The shock differs
in sign from the circumstance in (Card, 1990), and also differs by being a demand
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side shock as opposed to a supply side shock. Additionally, since industry level data
was not available for the difference-in-difference investigation in (Card, 1990), I am
able to use the increased degrees of freedom this dimension provides in order to
estimate a multilevel model where there is industry level heterogeneity in treatment
effect estimates. Allowing for this heterogeneity is important for consideration of
general equilibrium effects, and allows me to describe the within and across industry
adjustments to the shock.
Regional responses to employment shocks are well understood largely thanks to
(Blanchard et al., 1992). Here, the hypothesis that employment rates exhibit persis-
tence on account of a unit root, and formal statistical hypothesis testing suggests the
null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. Whether employment and margins
follow a unit root are important when considering the path these variables will take
through time. A unit root would imply that temporary shocks to employment would
have permanent effects on the employment levels for a given geographical unit. As
such, a careful consideration of the best response to employment shocks is warranted.
Unemployment rates do not exhibit such persistence, primarily on account of the role
of unemployment as a driver of migration as in (DaVanzo, 1978).
Using more recent data, (Dao et al., 2014) conduct a follow-up replication of
(Blanchard et al., 1992) and find many differences in comparison to the original paper.
Foremost, Dao2014 finds the long term effect of a regional shock to be nearly half of
the seminal work in (Blanchard et al., 1992). One important finding of their work for
my investigation is the relatively small response in interstate net migration, which I
am unable to measure due to the lack of annual data on in and out migration flows.
As opposed to out-migration, they find that most workers tend to either drop out of
the labor force, or remain unemployed in place of relocation. Due to the high demand
associated with high skilled labor in aerospace, I would hypothesize that the workers
are easily able to find employment in similar engineering or technical capacities.
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Two important adjustment mechanisms come into play when considering the ad-
justment to a negative regional labor demand shock. The presence of sticky wages,
particularly in empirically is found to be the case in (Hall, 2005), suggests adjust-
ments to the labor input decision are more likely to occur on extensive margins (lay-
offs) rather than on intensive margins like wage changes as found in (Barattieri et al.,
2010). Any time there are layoffs in industries where the workers have highly transfer-
able skills one should expect the region to experience some amount of out-migration
if the workers cannot get employment offers locally. Recognizing this, migration on
the part of firms could be a profit maximizing decision to take advantage of the ag-
glomeration economies. Agglomeration economies of this sort in high tech are well
documented, for instance in (Henderson, 2003). Whether the in-migration effect will
dominate is given by the relative strength and speed of both in the long-run. Em-
pirically, (Blanchard et al., 1992) find that most of the adjustment to an adverse
employment shock is through out-migration of labor as opposed to in-migration of
firms. Presumably this is on account of individuals being more mobile than firms, and
hence I suspect it will be the main transmission mechanism through which Brevard
county may feel any effects from discontinuing the STS program.
(Eckel et al., 1997a) examine the privatization of a single firm, British Airways, on
airfares and competitors’ stock prices. They find evidence that privatization increases
competition in a significant 7% fall in U.S. competitor stocks, and that the extent
of the fall is proportional to the degree in which the firms compete. Additional
support for a decrease in airfare was found, airfares in the international markets
served by British Airways fell 14.3% relative to other transatlantic routes. In part,
this line of literature demonstrates that the supply side analysis of privatization is
well researched, yet leaves much to be on the part of welfare and macroeconomic
analysis.
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(Saal and Parker, 2000) focused on one of the “rare” cases where the industry is
composed entirely of publicly held firms, all of which were privatized. They directed
attention towards identifying changes in economic efficiency “in terms of technical and
input price efficiencies captured in total costs” when England and Wales privatized
their water industry in 1989. Marginally significant evidence is found in support of the
idea that privatization had a beneficial impact on productivity growth. An indicator
for a pricing review in the middle of the sample time frame suggested that increasing
output price helped to slow the growth of costs for the private water producers.
As a thought exercise, applying the results of (Saal and Parker, 2000) to STS
discontinuation in the Space Coast would mean an a-priori ambiguous effect. On the
one hand, the private firms now providing space transportation services could locate
in Brevard. On the other hand, the Space Coast could continue to enjoy the tourism
and technological spillovers associated with being host to the industry, and potentially
draw in firms . In another state of the world, the private firms could locate outside
Brevard, and the county experiences little to none of the associated spillovers. The
presence of the highly immobile aerospace capital combined with a relatively “thick”
labor market for the supporting labor types makes in-migration an appealing option
for firms that are sufficiently mobile or are planning for expansion.
Models of privatization that are primarily theoretical, like (Che, 2009) and (Laban
and Wolf, 1993), focus on typical firm level effects. The former is more concerned
with investigating why privatization may fail to improve firm performance and the
role of institutional development in firm performance in the period after privatization.
The latter, though not dynamic, shares a common point with the former on account
of the investigations being in the context of transitioning economies like post-Soviet
era Russia. It seeks to explain the slow progress of large scale privatization, where
the tension is the result of differences in expectations of the returns to privatization.
My investigation is distinct from these, foremost since it is free from any confounding
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factors associated with an economy in transition due to periods of high institutional
uncertainty and erratic behavior that introduce temporal variation in confounding
factors that is difficult to measure or observe.
Previous studies in firm entry and exit yield some insight on the techniques to
analyzing changes in market structure within industries. In (Moretti, 2010), varia-
tion in the number of jobs in 2 industry categories are explained by variation in the
number of jobs in the tradable sector. First, the author regresses the change in the
number of jobs in the non-tradable sector on the change in jobs in the tradable sector.
Additionally, he regresses employment changes in a random segment of the tradable
sector on the change in employment for the rest of the sector. To isolate exogenous
shifts in labor demand for the manufacturing center, Moretti uses a weighted aver-
age of nationwide employment growth in 77 categories in manufacturing, with the
weights reflecting employment in each sector specific to each city. He finds significant
and positive “local multiplier” effects of employment in tradable manufacturing on
employment in the non-tradable sector, with an estimated elasticity of 0.55.
My approach to the investigation is distinct from the previously mentioned studies
in many ways. Foremost, my investigation is concerned with regional outcomes as
opposed to firm outcomes, as the former is well studied but the latter has significant
scope for research. I am more interested in how the shock influences labor allocation
and industrial composition, and less on the performance of individual firms, since the
regional response is important for consumers, firm managers, and central planners
alike. Additionally, the investigation I develop will not suffer from the instability
associated with investigations conducted in transitioning economies as those studies
in post-Soviet Russia. The retirement of the Shuttle fleet provides an example of a
sectoral shock in a geographic location with stable institutions and stable contract
enforcement. Conducting the investigation in the context of a stable macroeconomy
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makes the approach more credible in the sense that the regional adjustment is being
driven by market forces instead of cronyism.
2.2 Empirical Investigation
2.2.1 Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Employment 196040.133 195103.3
Establishments 13094.9 9199.133
Annual Payroll (1,000 U.S. $) 6902742.117 7459460.574
% firms with 50 employees or more 4.5 0.9
% firms with 100 employees or more 2.0 0.5
Table 2.1: Industrial summary statistics for Florida’s space coast 2004-2012
In September 2004 George W. Bush announced plans for the retirement of the
Shuttle program and the transition of space transport from public provision to private
provision. Initially, the final year of launches was scheduled for 2010. Unanticipated
delays in the missions during 2010 necessitated an extension of the program until the
final launch in July 2011. With this in mind, for difference-in-difference investigation I
take 2012 to mark the post-treatment period since it is the year after the final Shuttle
launch. With a difference-in-difference approach, I will focus on comparing Brevard
to its 5 neighboring counties; 2 of which are coastal: Indian River, and Volusia, as
well as Orange , Osceola, and Seminole counties which are landlocked. These counties
are similar to Brevard in many ways, with the exception that none were host to the
Shuttle program.
The Census County Business Patterns (CBP) gives data at the industry-county-
year level, where industries are divided into various resolutions with descriptions
from 2-6 digits in length. Descriptions with 2 digits are sectors, while those with 3 are
subsectors, 5 digits are national industries, and so on. Of the variables provided in the
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CBP data, my dependent variables include the establishment and employment counts,
and annual payroll. At the sub sector level, each establishment is categorized into one
of 87 different 3 digit identifiers. With more disaggregation at the 5 digit level, there
are somewhere near 285 different national industries. Let the set In be the collection
of unique NAICS categories at the n digit description level. Thus, I3 has 87 elements
and I5 has somewhere near 285. I find that econometric analysis at the 3 digit level
is a healthy compromise between analytical practicality and keeping the volume of
results manageable. The results are fully generalizable at more disaggregated NAICS
descriptions.
Variation in the establishment counts within and across counties comes from many
sources. Foremost, changes in macroeconomic conditions like aggregate demand for
goods and services will have a direct effect on this measure. For Brevard, there is
a dense concentration of engineering and manufacturing establishments oriented to-
wards space transportation equipment manufacturing. Population is also a significant
determinant of establishment counts. A larger population will need more firms, larger
firms, or both relative to a smaller neighboring county. A larger population will also
demand a larger variety of goods. As such, changes in the population may effect
the firm counts in categories that are sensitive to this margin determinant. Across
counties, time invariant effects like the presence of tourist attractions like Florida’s
beaches, or how Florida’s “sunshine” climate makes it an attraction for golfers also
drives some of the variation in establishment counts.
Variation in the employment of industry j within a county is foremost assumed
to be the result of changes to macroeconomic conditions like aggregate demand. For
instance, the decrease in consumption from the Great Recession may have lead some
firms to not have sufficient demand to cover variable costs and therefore to layoff
employees or discontinue production. I assume that macroeconomic effects of this
sort are common to all industries and counties in the sample, and will be detected
71
with the inclusion of time dummy variables also common to all industries and counties
in the sample. Employment in Brevard certainly will vary on account of the shock of
retiring the Shuttle fleet, since many employees were displaced from engineering and
specialty firms like United Launch Alliance, United Space Alliance, etc. Presumably,
some of these employees will substitute towards other firms in the same industry
working on projects unrelated to the Shuttle program, others will supply their labor
in different industries, while others will do both of these after migrating from Brevard.
Changes in employment for each industry as a result of discontinuation of STS
funding can ideally broken down into two effects. One possible effect is an “across
industry substitution effect” where workers in a given industry (take aerospace engi-
neering as an example) will place into jobs in fields outside their specialty. Perhaps
some will go into scientific consulting, others into teaching, etc. A second and dis-
tinct effect would be a “within industry substitution effect” where employees working
in firm A in industry j move to firm B in industry j. Third, there is also a po-
tential transition to unemployment or non-participation for the standard reasons. If
estimates suggest a given industry experienced decreased employment as a result of
the shock, we know that the net effect is some combination of across industry sub-
stitution, and out-migration/non-participation effects. Likewise, if estimates suggest
increased employment in a given industry as a shock response, we know that this may
be a combination of across industry substitution, and new hires from the unemployed
and in-migrants.
As an example, if I consider the annual (log) employment change for 2011-2012
in “Professional, Scientific, and Technical services” (NAICS 54), seen in (Figure 2.3
page 73), I note that there was a large decrease in employment for a particularly
high productivity sector. I would assume that the majority of this decrease is the
result of the massive layoffs in the industries allied with the Shuttle program. Using
a difference-in-difference approach will allow me to determine precisely how much of
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the change is attributable to the stop in launches by trying to estimate what the
employment change would have been had the policy not changed.
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Figure 2.3: Change in logarithm of employment for Professional, Scientific, and Tech-
nical Services sector, 2011-2012 for Brevard relative to other counties
2.2.2 Specification
There are many options for specifying a difference in difference estimator for this
investigation. My strategy is to use a typical difference-in-difference specification
with an indicator for the ”treatment” of being host to the space program. For reasons
previously discussed, I take the pre-treatment period as 2004 and the post treatment
period as 2012. The difference-in-difference specification follows in (2.1).
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Yic,t =β0 + βi1Hostc,t + βi2D2012 + βi3Hostc,tPostc,t
+
c∑
γcDc +
2011∑
t=2005
γtDt +
i∑
γiDi + ic,t
(2.1)
I adopt i as an index of the many NAICS industries tracked in the CBP, c as
an index of the 6 counties used for the investigation, and t to indicate the year in
question. Here, Yic,t represents the outcome variable of interest, either establishment
counts, employment counts, or annual payroll. Hostc,t is an indicator variable that is
unity for Brevard county in all years except 2012 since it was the only county to host
shuttle launches during these years. The indicator for the post-treatment period is
given by Postc,t, which is unity for all counties during the year 2012 and zero other-
wise. In turn, Hostc,tPostc,t takes the value one only for Brevard county during the
post-treatment year 2012. The specification also includes county, year, and industry
fixed effects as denoted by the terms in the last three summation signs of (2.1). These
fixed effects control for the average differences in observable and unobservable char-
acteristics across industries and counties that may be determinants of the outcome
variables of interest. Examples of such determinants that were previously include
things like beaches and large tourist attractions like Disney World, as well as zoning
laws. Sources of variation that are common to all counties are captured by the year
indicators Dt, where the baseline year is taken to be 2004.
Notice that the coefficient on the treatment interaction, βi3, is indexed by industry.
This is to indicate that I estimate industry specific treatment effects. Implementing
this flexible feature is as simple as interacting the treatment interaction Hostc,tD2012
with a complete set of industry indicators. Doing so allows for a more generalized
functional specification, and relaxes the strong assumption that all industries respond
in a symmetric manner to changes in the treatment indicator. Additionally, this
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flexibility allows the model to capture more of the variance in the outcome variable
while nesting the possibility of symmetric responses across industries. Finally, it will
allow for a secondary analysis to characterize the across industry heterogeneity in
treatment responses.
Estimation of the partial effects of discontinued funding of the STS on the various
outcome variables of interest is simple. To show this, take conditional expectations of
(2.1) for Brevard and any other county (I will use Indian River since it is a desirable
baseline county), using the fact that Hostc,t = 0 for all counties that are not Brevard,
holding the industry constant at i = j, and recognizing that 2004 is the baseline year:
E[Yic,t|i = j, c = Brevard, t = 2004] = β0 + β1 + γj
E[Yic,t|i = j, c = Indian River, t = 2004] = β0 + γj
E[Yic,t|i = j, c = Brevard, t = 2012] = β0 + β1 + β2 + βj3 + γj
E[Yic,t|i = j, c = Indian River, t = 2012] = β0 + β2 + γj
(2.2)
Here, I adopt the notation µj,c,t to indicate the expected outcome for industry j in
county c at time t. The treatment effect is identified with the traditional “difference-
in-difference” calculation:
(µj,Brevard,2012 − µj,V olusia,2012)− (µj,Brevard,2004 − µj,V olusia,2004)
= [(β0 + β1 + β2 + βj3 + γ3j)− (β0 + β2 + γ3j)]
− [(β0 + β1 + γj)− (β0 + γj)]
= (β1 + βj3)− (β1)
= βj3
(2.3)
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2.2.3 Results and Discussion
Estimation results of (2.1) are given in the appendix. P-values are reported directly
below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are estimated with clustering at
the county level, as this is the largest geographic level for which I anticipate serial
correlation in the residuals. A series of bubble graphs will aid in interpreting results,
the first of which presented in (Figure 2.4).The horizontal axis coordinate of each
bubble corresponds to each NAICS 3 digit sub sector in the sample data. Each 3
digit integer is just a categorical representation of an industry, hence there is no
meaning to their order. Subsectors (3 digit descriptions) with a common 2 digit
sector description are likely to share industrial characteristics and be “close” in a
competitive sense of competing together either in the product or input markets. The
vertical axis coordinate of each bubble corresponds to a treatment effect estimate, ˆβj,3,
in the econometric specification in (2.1) on p. 74. Each bubble’s center coordinates is
an industry, treatment effect estimate pair (NAICS industry, ˆβj,3). The area of each
bubble is proportional to the industry share of total margin in question. Only the
industries with treatment effects significant at the 95 % confidence level are presented
in the graph. Ex-post consideration of the across industry heterogeneity in treatment
effect estimates in this fashion allows for a characterization of changes in industrial
composition, income, and market structure as a treatment response to stopping the
STS launches.
Employment Results
Employment results were mixed. A brief tally of the signs of industrial treatment
effects suggest 17 industries with relatively increased employment and 17 decreased
employment. This leaves 51 industries with either no change in employment or with-
out an estimate due to multicollinearity. A graphical representation of the results is
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Figure 2.4: Employment treatment effect estimates
given in (Figure 2.4). Given a 5% probability of type 1 hypothesis testing error, I
would expect to estimate 4-5 of the 85 sub sector (3 digit) treatment effects spuriously.
In a short run investigation, where capital structure is taken as given, employment is
a margin that can be adjusted freely. As such, it will paint a different picture than
the establishment count results, payroll results, or firm size results.
Visualizing the treatment effect estimates as in (Figure 2.4) allows for intuitive
understanding of labor allocation changes as a result of the discontinuation of STS
launches. Since the outcome variable is measured as full time and part time employees,
the vertical axis corresponds to how industrial employment changed in 2012 relative
to a counterfactual world where STS launches continued. There are many takeaways
from these results. First, note that in employment terms, many large and small
industries had treatment effects that were different from zero. Second, note there
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is heterogeneity across subsectors in the magnitude of the effect. A second pattern
to note is the heterogeneity across sectors. Some, like manufacturing, seemed to
benefit, while other service oriented industries like Real estate, Management, and
Administrative/Support services consistently suffered.
Consistent with immigration outflows outweighing inflows and a general decrease
in Brevard’s growth rate, are the effects in the Construction sector (23X). Building
Construction (236) had a decrease in employment of roughly 1200 positions, and
specialty contractors has an estimated loss of nearly 3 times this amount. Housing
construction is viewed as a leading indicator of regional economic activity as discussed
in (Stock and Watson, 1989). The strength of this variable as a leading indicator will
be more clear as more years of NAICS data are released.
Searching for evidence of across industry employment substitution starts with
considering the industries that would demand the specialized labor associated with
Shuttle launches. Firms that provide inputs to the launch production process may
compete with other STS supporting firms in the labor market. Given that much of the
launch services labor is highly specialized and composes a relatively minor part of a
larger transportation industry, it is expected that the labor qualified in this industry
can also easily become qualified in it’s allied industries like commercial aerospace
transportation manufacturing and specialized computer manufacturing.
Consistent with a discontinuation in tourism spillovers are the decreased employ-
ment in accommodation (721) potentially connected to tourism. This description
aggregates over travel accommodations in general, including hotels and associated
overnight accommodations. Anecdotally, anyone raised on the Space Coast knows
how launches were a spectacle that drew people from around the world. The closer
you were to Cape Canaveral, the more people you would see pulled over to watch a
launch, particularly on the causeways that connect the barrier island to the mainland.
This magnitude of tourism draw is associated with consumption of travel related ser-
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vices, like those in accommodation and the Amusement and Recreation sub sector
(713), which also had a statistically significant negative treatment effect estimate.
Hence it makes sense that firms in this sector felt a pinch from the stop in big ticket
launches like those in the STS program.
Another way of gaining insights from simple meta-analysis is to appeal to the
binomial sign test. Each industry is represented as an individual “trial”, and for each
industry I take the trial to be a success if the treatment effect estimate is significantly
different from zero at the α = 0.05 level. Estimation results show 34 significant
effects in 85 industries for which data are available. Suppose that the probability of
a null treatment effect is equal to the probability of a statistically significant effect at
α = 0.05. More precisely, adopt:
HO : Pr( ˆβj,3 = 0) = Pr( ˆβj,3 6= 0) = 0.5
HA : Pr( ˆβj,3 = 0) 6= Pr( ˆβj,3 6= 0)
(2.4)
Using the data from the employment results in (Table 3.8) as the trials, the proba-
bility of estimating 34 or fewer significant estimates is approximately 4%. Prior to
considering any industry characteristics, I can say that there is a large chance of any
individual industry exhibiting a response to the treatment.
Repeating this meta-analysis by conditioning on the set of significant treatment
effect estimates for the employment results in (Table 3.8) gives 34 “trials” to work
with. Here I consider a “success” event to be a positive treatment effect estimate,
ˆβj,3 > 0, for which there are 17. Overall, I can estimate a “probability of growth”
since a successful event represents a treatment effect estimate with a positive effect on
the outcome in question. In contrast to this probability of growth there is a negative
treatment effect estimate, the “probability of contraction”1 − p. Given an equal
probability of growth and contraction, which is specified in (2.5) estimating at most
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17 positive effects in 34 trials is a common occurrence with a probability of ≈ 56%.
With a p-value of ≈ 0.56, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that the probability of growth is different from the probability of contraction in the
sample data.
HO : Pr( ˆβj,3 > 0) = Pr( ˆβj,3 < 0) = 0.5
HA : Pr( ˆβj,3 > 0) 6= Pr( ˆβj,3 < 0)
(2.5)
Unemployment Results
Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, I was able to attain unemployment
rates for a panel of Florida counties from 2004-2012. I estimate a specification sim-
ilar to 2.1 with unemployment as the outcome variable. Since unemployment is an
aggregate statistic and not an industry specific measure, the specification becomes
unemployedct = α + Ic + It︸ ︷︷ ︸
county and year fixed effects
+β ∗ HostctPostct︸ ︷︷ ︸
treatment indicator
+ct (2.6)
The specification in (2.6) differs from the discussed specification (2.1) in that the
outcome variable only varies at the county-year level, so I cannot estimate industry
specific slope parameters. Select results from estimation of (2.6) appear in (Table
2.2), with full results appearing in the appendix. I bootstrap the standard errors of
β in order to not rely on assumptions regarding its distribution to show its statistical
significance.
Interpreting these unemployment results suggest that the shock associated with
retiring the Shuttle fleet resulted in an increase in unemployment in Brevard of ap-
proximately 3,700 more workers than had the program still been in operation. This
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Unemployed
Treatment Effect 3,702.871
(2.08)*
2005bn.year -1,022.761
(0.85)
2006.year -1,490.194
(1.16)
2007.year -345.761
(0.30)
2008.year 2,803.567
(3.48)**
2009.year 8,301.164
(6.49)**
2010.year 9,371.373
(6.33)**
2011.year 8,058.896
(6.63)**
2012.year 6,051.539
(6.31)**
cons 3,025.353
(3.39)**
R2 0.83
N 603
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Table 2.2: Unemployment treatment effect estimates
number is about half of the aggregate amount of layoffs by the largest two space
transportation firms, suggesting that there is evidence of either out-migration or sub-
stitution to employment within and across industries. With unemployment for Bre-
vard in 2012 at 24,794 workers, the implied counterfactual unemployment in Brevard
lies somewhere near 21,000 workers. Considering the magnitude of the employment
effect, unemployment in Brevard spiked nearly 17% in a single year as a result of the
shock.
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Establishment Count Results
Of the 87 unique 3 digit sub sectors in the NAICS classification system represented
in the sample data, I estimated 12 negative coefficients and 3 positive coefficients,
with 72 industries either being statistically indistinguishable from zero or dropped
due to multicollinearity. Given a 5% probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of no
treatment effect, βj,3 = 0, given that the effect is actually zero, I expect to estimate
≈ 5 industry effects as the result of type 1 error. Of all the margins of adjustment I
investigate, establishment counts will have the highest persistence and be the slowest
to adjust. Microeconomic theory suggests that a firm may continue to operate at a loss
in the short-run, and considering only the year after discontinued STS funding (due
to current data limitations) places this investigation in that time frame. I expect that
this “sluggishness” of capital means there will be less colorful results for this margin
of adjustment. Ideally, firms would adjust on the employment margin, and only exit
if not running a profit in the long-run, which is not necessarily 2012, the year taken
as the “post-treatment” period. However, increasing the specificness of the NAICS
description by moving to 5 digit descriptions shows a more detailed story.
Of the industries directly connected to the space program, like those associated
with “Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services” (54X) and aerospace related
manufacturing, there is little evidence of a response on the establishment count margin
at the 3 digit NAICS level. Notice in (Figure 2.5) the net exit within the construc-
tion industry, perhaps due to lower than expected housing growth squeezing out the
relatively less efficient firms. In a richer 4 digit investigation, construction related
industries includes residential and nonresidential building construction, as well as
foundation, structure and exterior contractors and building equipment contractors
which include electrical, plumbing, heating, and air-conditioning.
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Figure 2.5: Establishment count treatment effect estimates
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Net exit is not limited to firms associated with the construction side. Effects are
also present on the material input side to construction through a response in many
construction related manufacturing industries: plastic, gas, steel, electrical lighting,
electrical equipment all relatively consolidated, along with consolidation in wholesale
of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies. With a labor demand
shock of this sort it is expected that there may be a slump in construction spending
associated with both hesitation from current county residents as well as from potential
in-migrant workers and firms who were “on the edge” regarding entry in Brevard to
serve the regional markets. Part of this slump also may represent a slowing of demand
for housing in Brevard due to out-migration and the across industry substitution
response where the new entrants are located elsewhere in the state or nation.
Many of the estimates are consistent with generic decreases in aggregate demand
and out-migration. For instance, I see that though grocery had an effect indistinguish-
able from zero, grocery wholesalers (4244) had a statistically significant establishment
exit. On the retail side, both home furnishings (4422) and lawn and garden (4442)
related retailers experienced consolidation, which could be on account of both out-
migration and decreased aggregate expenditure on consumer durable goods. Also
consistent with the out-migration story is the exit of firms in the storage and ware-
housing (4931) industry, which is surely due to decreased demand for local storage if
there is a net movement out of the county.
Of the effects that are likely related to tourism, there was a significant reduction
in the establishments affiliated in the transportation industry, particularly scenic
and sightseeing transportation (4879), as well as taxi and limo services (4853), and
urban transit systems (4851) . There was also a direct decrease in establishments
affiliated with traveller accommodations, presumably on account of the launches no
longer drawing spectators to the county. This category includes Hotels and Motels,
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as well as bed and breakfast type operations that presumably were being booked by
spectators and journalists.
As previously stated, not all of the effects on the establishment margin were neg-
ative. There is clear evidence of across-industry substitution into more technical
manufacturing industries like basic chemical manufacturing (3251), pharmaceutical
and medical manufacturing (3254) as well as navigational, electronic, medical, and
control instruments manufacturing (3345). Consistent with the hypothesis that firms
may enter into business in Brevard to take advantage of the relative abundance of
highly skilled and potentially unemployed labor is the positive entry within the Archi-
tectural, Engineering, and Related Services industry (5413). Since this is an industry
that is likely not perfectly competitive in input or output markets, entrant firms could
have bargaining power in what is an oligopsonized industry.
Payroll Results
Payroll results exhibit a high degree of across industry heterogeneity in estimates,
with the estimation yielding 8 positive coefficients and 19 negative coefficients with
58 industries having coefficients either not distinct from zero or dropped due to mul-
ticollinearity. A graphical representation of the results is given in (Figure 2.6). This
shares the same 4-5 potentially spurious results due to type 1 statistical error.
An obvious pattern in the payroll treatment effect estimates is the strength of
across industry substitution and growth in manufacturing of computers and electron-
ics as well as transportation equipment (336). One component of the increase in trans-
portation equipment manufacturing payroll is the entry of Embraer, a South American
regional jet manufacturer. According to their estimates in a 2010 press release, Em-
braer contributes over 230 engineering and support jobs to Brevard via a relatively
new manufacturing plant adjacent to Melbourne International Airport. Aside from
aerospace transportation equipment manufacturing, there was entry by sea trans-
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Figure 2.6: Payroll treatment effect estimates
portation equipment manufacturers, Bertram Yacht’s relocation to Merritt Island
being a prime example. The treatment effect estimate suggests that payroll in trans-
portation equipment manufacturing increased by $162, 151 ∗ $1, 000 = $162, 151, 000
more than had the STS program continued to operate.
Consistent with a decrease in tourism spillovers are the decreases in the accom-
modation (72X) and Amusement (71X) sectors. For example, the payroll treatment
effect estimate for Accommodation is -160075, as given in (Table 3.8) in the appendix.
County Business Patterns reports payroll in thousands of dollars, so the center of the
confidence interval for this estimate is −$165, 076 ∗ $1000 = −$165, 076, 000 lower
than the counterfactual outcome for Brevard. Given the GDP estimate in (E.D.C.,
2010), this makes for a nearly 1% decrease in regional income in and of its own.
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Aggregate Effect Estimates
To assess the “macro” impact of discontinued STS funding, I take a weighted average
of treatment effects for each industry, where weights represent the industry share of
the total outcome in question. As a concrete example, let’s examine ways of determin-
ing some notion of an aggregate effect for Brevard. The estimation procedure allows
for assessing these “macro” impact estimates on the outcome variables of interest. If
I had to sort the outcome variables by how quickly they can be adjusted, it would be
payroll → employment → establishments, and I consider them in this order.
To begin, let the set Sk = {i = 1, 2, ...s} represent the collection of s industries
for which a statistically significant treatment effect estimate exists from estimation
of (2.1) at the k digit NAICS level in the empirical section as described. One notion
of an aggregate effect is simply the net effect, defined as the sum of the treatment
effect estimate over all industries, as specified in (2.7):
Net Effectoutcome =
∑
s∈S3
βˆs3 (2.7)
Outcome Positive Negative Net Effect
Payroll 1,227,400 -1,572,909 -345,509
Employment 32,213.44 -40,158.1 -8,034.65
Establishments 367.15 -832.00 -464.815
Table 2.3: Aggregate effect estimate
The results of this procedure to determine an aggregate effect with the estimation
results from (2.1) is presented in (Table 2.3). I construct this table by aggregating
over industries. Payroll units represent $1, 000. Employment is measured as the count
of full and part-time employees, including salaried officers and executives of corpo-
rations, who are on the payroll in the pay period including March 12. Included are
employees on paid sick leave, holidays, and vacations; not included are sole proprietors
and partners of unincorporated businesses. Establishments are measured as counts.
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Of primary interest is the net effect on income for Florida’s Space Coast, which sug-
gest that reported income decreased by $345, 509, 000, or just over a third of a billion
dollars. This net effect is the sum of an increase in income of approximately 1.22
billion dollars for industries above the origin in (Figure 2.6) with a decrease of nearly
1.57 billion. Nearly half of the payroll increase is from growth in the Computer and
Electronic Manufacturing sector. Presumably, much of the decrease in income stems
from the dwindling tourism and high tech draw formerly associated with the Shuttle
program. A primary policy goal in light of this figure is to identify a mechanism to
minimize the loss of income to the region. The net income effect estimate of ≈ 345
million underestimates the true income effect, since it does not account for any mul-
tiplier effects. Incorporating a conservative multiplier estimate from (Beemiller and
Friedenberg, 1992) of ≈ 2, the income impact to the Space Coast could be as high
as a $700, 000, 000 decrease over the coming years. On the other hand, more recent
news of the location decision of privatized aerospace transportation contractors like
SpaceX and Blue Horizon to operate on the Space Coast.
On an extensive margin like employment, there was a net effect of a decrease in
employment of approximately 8,000 positions. This effect is the sum of a large draw
from industries like Computer, Electronics, Machinery, and Transportation equipment
manufacturing demanding over 11,000 employees. These subsectors alone account
for ≈ 33% share of the total estimated employment gain of 32,213 employees as
reported in (Table 2.3). Large negative effects from the decreased tourism spillovers
is dominated by a decrease in employment experienced by the tourism subsectors,
which together had an estimated loss of over 11,000 employees. This tourism loss
composes just over 25% of the total decrease in employment after launches stopped.
The estimated effect for the most “sluggish” margin of adjustment, establish-
ment counts, is a decrease of approximately 464 establishments across the represented
NAICS sub sectors. This net exit of 464 firms can be decomposed into entry of 367
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firms across 3 sub sectors, offset by a decrease of 832 establishments across 12 sub
sectors. The largest estimated establishment decreases were realized by the construc-
tion and real estate sub sectors, which is consistent with a decrease regional aggregate
demand and foreshadows further regional economic contraction. Consistent with the
decrease in tourism spillovers from the launches was the contraction in the accom-
modation sub sector, whose estimated 40 establishment contraction treatment effect
estimate is approximately 5% of the total estimated contraction.
2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I used a multilevel difference-in-difference technique to examine re-
gional responses to the sectoral shock associated with privatizing the space program
and retiring NASA’s shuttle fleet. The multilevel approach allowed for estimation
of within and across industry margins of adjustment previously not considered by
the literature on regional economic shocks. The first of these is an across industry
substitution effect, evidence of which can be found in the nearly 32,000 employee
increase in some industries to nearly offset the 40,000 employee decrease in other in-
dustries, as per (Table 2.3). Without a multilevel regression specification, being able
to decompose a net effect of the shock into offsetting positive and negative effects
at the industry level is not possible. Without the added industry dimension, it is
only possible to estimate the net effect. The small net effect on employment counts,
establishment counts, and payroll, as provided in (Figure 2.4) and (Table 3.8) in the
appendix, vastly understates the disturbance caused by the shock. Evidence of this
reallocation is present in every margin of adjustment considered. My estimates sug-
gest that the shock to unemployment (a near 17% increase) dwarfs the net effect on
regional income.
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With this in mind, a policy goal of stabilizing regional income must have a two
pronged approach. First, it must minimize income losses to the region by incentivizing
firms subject to the shock to avoid out-migration. To this degree, the first policy
instrument available to local and state central planners would be a reduction in taxes
to incentivize continued operation. This could be combined with a reduction in
nominal expenses for permitting/licensing. In addition to incentivizing establishments
delay or forgo exit in light of the shock, the region could incentivize establishments
to in-migrate. An effort along this line starts with a vast marketing campaign to
appeal both to employees and to firm managers. Following marketing appeal, central
planners could again use tax incentives. An investment in these campaigns acts
not only to attract visitors, but acts as a good faith investment in increasing the
population draw to the region.
Future work on examining this particular type of shock clearly should focus on de-
veloping a synthetic control structure approach in order to verify the results hold un-
der less strict assumptions. The traditional difference-in-difference approach requires
that the differences between the treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment
period be fixed over time. The synthetic control approach, as discussed in (Abadie
et al., 2010) generalizes this by allowing unobserved confounding factors to vary over
time. I could use this technique to verify the robustness of the results from the mul-
tilevel difference-in-difference approach. Synthetic control gives results that are time
varying, which would add an appealing dynamic perspective. The only challenge in
implementing this in practice at the moment is the lack of County Business Pattern
data in the period after 2012.
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CHAPTER 3
RETAIL ESTABLISHMENT SIZE AND THE SPATIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Past retail research estimates a positive relationship between the population in a
geographic area and retail establishment counts. The intuition is simple: larger areas
demand both a greater quantity and greater variety of goods, making increased retail
presence a necessity. In contrast to this, simple fixed effect estimators fit to annual
data by the Census Statistics of U.S. Business data do not provide uniform evidence
for this hypothesis across the nation’s industries. In select cases, such investigations
provide evidence to the contrary. With this research, I intend to understand the
many reasons the results of today may differ from the estimates of 40 years ago. I
hypothesize that in a short run investigation where the brick and mortar location of
the retail establishment is held fixed, establishments adjust to the sales growth by
demanding more labor as inputs to the production of retail goods. Thus, an industry-
area-year level measure of an intensive margin such as employment per establishment
or the proportion of firms with x many employees is a more appropriate outcome
variable for measuring retail growth than participatory measures like establishment
counts.
I make several contributions to the understanding of retail industrial organization
and regional commerce with this investigation. First, I explain the insensitivity of
retail establishment counts to market growth by examining establishment size an
alternative margin of adjustment to growth. I demonstrate the utility of Department
of Defense satellite data to measure economic activity and the spatial distribution of
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economic activity at sub-national levels. This data is an improvement on any current
standard that relies on reported income alone as it is a direct measure of both reported
and unreported on economic activity. To this point, this analysis is the first to use
the night light data for econometric analysis in empirical industrial organization. I
utilize a dynamic panel model ala (Blundell and Bond, 1998) in order to determine the
effect of economic activity growth and spatial variation in economic activity on retail
establishment size measures. My contribution has descriptive aspects as it is the first
to estimate these partial correlations between the moments of the income distribution
and the retail industry using the improved night light data and the county business
pattern data.
(Figure 3.1) provides graphical evidence of the negative relationship between the
number of Grocers per capita and population for a cross section of Florida counties
as a motivating example in the cross section. Notice that the smaller counties actu-
ally have relatively more establishments serving each citizen. By comparison, large
counties have relatively fewer establishments per capita. This negative relationship
is highlighted by the fitted curve in (Figure 3.1).
Instead of relying on cross-sectional variation to identify the effect of increasing
market size, I use the DMSP data to construct measures of both the mean level of
economic activity within the county, as well as the dispersion of the activity. Using
the (spatial) standard deviation of night light intensity will as a measure of spatial
uniformity of the economic activity. Both of these variables will allow for identification
of any concentrating effects of market growth and changes in the spatial distribution
of income on establishment sizes by tying changes in industrial indicators to changes
in economic activity within the county.
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Figure 3.1: Market size and concentration relationship in Florida’s grocery industry
3.1.2 Related Literature
My objective is to quantify the correlation between market size and retail estab-
lishment size. The effect of interest is the elasticity of retail establishment size with
respect to changes in market size and changes in spatial variation of economic activity.
If you believe the typical “Walmart effect” story, then regional market growth will be
met with a concentration to larger big box type retailers that offer several higher or-
der goods and services under a single roof. Unlike the typical “Walmart effect” story,
such as,(Basker, 2005a), (Basker, 2005b), or (Stone, 1988), I do not explicitly focus
on Walmart itself. Rather, I take the ”Walmart effect” to mean there are certain
“critical points” in the growth of a region beyond which big box retailers like Ikea
or Walmart maximize profits by entering and competing in the industry-county pair.
Before these critical points are reached, it is likely the case that retail is dominated
by firms that do not enjoy the economies of scale/scope that characterizes big box
type retail firms. These existing firms likely have higher markups than their big box
counterparts. As large retailers open, they use economies of scale/scope to compete at
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a lower markup, and they gain market share from smaller firms with higher markups.
This is the typical reallocation within industry, as described in (Melitz, 2003b), and
is of benefit to the consumer since it reduces the prices they face at retail. From this
perspective, retailers not in immediate competition may directly benefit from entry
by big box retailers since the reduction in prices raises demand for other goods via
both cross price elasticity effects as well as through income effects.
In part, this chapter is motivated from robust results in (Vitt, 2015). Results
therein suggested there is either an insignificant or negative correlation between the
growth of the population in a state and the number of retailers serving each citi-
zen. This result stands in contrast to previous estimates of the relationship, as in
(Clements, 1978) and (Forbes, 1972). The latter of these references suggests that a 1%
increase in the population of a MSA is associated with a 0.96% increase in the number
of retail establishments. It’s somewhat naive to think that this estimated relationship
from decades ago would extrapolate to the population levels and market structure
retail faces today. Further, evidence in (Vitt, 2015), (Sutton, 1991), and (Shaked and
Sutton, 1983) all suggest that in models of competition with relatively simple cost
structures there exists a bound to the fragmentation in a market. A bound of this
sort matters since it implies that beyond some critical market size all sales growth is
absorbed by incumbent firms. The only dimensions along which existing firms can ac-
commodate the growth is through expanding their brick and mortar structure, hiring
additional employees, or both of these simultaneously. In econometric application,
the existence of a bound to market fragmentation means that we cannot expect the
marginal effect of population on retail establishment counts to always be non-zero
and statistically significant. To ensure that this pattern in (Vitt, 2015) is not simply
an artifact from relying on intercensal population estimates as proxies for market size,
I demonstrate the utility of satellite imagery of night light activity as a measure of
market size.
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One effort to understand the determinants of firm size across industries is laid out
in (Kumar et al., 1999). Judiciary efficiency, financial market development, capital
intensity, and market size are all used to explain variation in establishment size. The
coauthors are upfront about how their endeavors are primarily descriptive and that
their estimates reflect partial correlations. They find that a 1% increase in market
size, as measured by total employment within the associated 2 digit industry, is asso-
ciated with a 0.19% increase in employment. Defining market size in this manner is
problematic for many reasons. Foremost, it neglects the varying labor intensity across
industries, skewing the true size of the market to reflect the relative labor intensity
of the industry. Second, the coauthors use log population as an instrument for log
market size. While log population certainly satisfies the “relevance” criteria of an in-
strument, the authors make no attempt to convince the reader as to why this would
satisfy the exclusion restriction required of ideal instruments. Since the dependent
variable is the (log of) employment in an industry divided by the establishment count
in the industry, it is hard to believe that log population would not be a determinant of
other establishment count determinants, violating the exclusion restriction required
of instruments. For example, since large populations correlate highly with the cost
of living through one of the many channels discussed in (Haworth and Rasmussen,
1973), it is likely the case that corr(Populationst, wagest) 6= 0 while simultaneously
corr(wage,#retailers) 6= 0.
A case study of the concentrating effect of market growth towards larger “big box”
and “category killer” retailers in the Toronto area is described in (Jones and Doucet,
2000). In this study, the researchers find that during the 1990s, the largest period of
growth for “big box” retailing, the relative importance of retail as represented by the
proportion of occupied storefronts fell from 53.7% in 1994 to 49.5% in 1997. They
find that the share of total stores declined on average by 7% in response to entry by
big box retailers, with the greatest number of closures occurring in office products
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(-23%) and hardware (-17%). The results agree with other similar studies in the area,
like (Haltiwanger et al., 2010), who find that the share of employment accounted for
by big-box retail comes at the expense of single establishment and small chain stores.
The common denominator between these studies is the fact that they focus on the
effects of big-box retail on existing competition, as opposed to determining process
of concentration into larger retailers.
3.1.3 Simple Example
To form expectations of the sign of the relationship between income growth and retail
establishment size, I appeal to a comparative static exercise. Consider two hypothet-
ical geographical areas with identical income distributions and marginal propensities
to consume from income, with the exception that one area has larger and growing
consumer mass. This larger area must consume a larger quantity of goods than the
smaller area, since it simply has more of the identical representative agent. From this
alone, big box type retailers able to compete on scale have a larger incentive to es-
tablish operations in the growing area compared to the area not experiencing growth.
It is not immediately clear that increasing the number of agents in the area leads
to a greater diversity of preferences on account of spatial “clustering” in preferences.
A “clustering” of preferences is most apparent along the income dimension, perhaps
due to sorting a la (Tiebout, 1956). Marginal consumers will only bring a diversity of
preferences if their preferences are not already represented among those in the area.
Empirically, we tend to see a larger variety of goods where there is greater vari-
ation in income, since such areas likely have many areas with clustered preferences
demanding different consumption baskets. Again, consider two hypothetical areas, of
equal size in terms of representative agents, one of which has agents with identical in-
comes, and the other where there are income “clusters” as previously discussed. This
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relatively less homogeneous area is likely to have more diverse preferences on account
of the heterogeneity and clustering in incomes. Though not explicitly divided into
strata, each strata of income could demand a different set of products. Thus areas
with high variation in income are desirable for retail competitors that compete on
economies of scale and scope like the big box retailers.
With Florida having 63 counties, the night light data should have plenty of vari-
ation to allow me to identify the consequences of increasing the spatial variation in
economic activity on local retail market structures while holding changes economic
activity at a constant. It should also allow for me to isolate the pure income growth
effect on local retail market structure, as well as the pure income dispersion effect.
Using the night light data for measures of the changing spatial dispersion of eco-
nomic activity is one of the novelties of this study, and is one of the true advantages
of working with the satellite data. Data based on reported income measures are able
to describe economic growth for a region, but is unable to do describe the spatial
distribution of the activity.
3.2 Empirical Investigation
3.2.1 Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Coeff. Var Min. Max.
Establishment Size 6.604 19.391 2.936 0 424.667
Proportion 50+ 0.062 0.206 3.323 0 1
Proportion 100+ 0.038 0.162 4.263 0 1
Std. Dev. Night lights 14.474 7.18 0.496 3.235 27.71
Mean Night Lights 14.787 12.615 0.853 0.940 59.572
Median Night Lights 10.373 15.497 1.494 0 63
N 31608
Table 3.1: Establishment Size Summary Statistics
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For the purposes of this investigation, I use a panel of industry-county pairs ob-
served annually from 2004-2012 to identify the effect of economic activity growth and
changes in the spatial distribution of economic activity on retail firm sizes. To mea-
sure both the changing mean and spatial dispersion of income, I will use the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration’s Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program “night-light” data (DMSP hereafter). The “night light” data comes from
the sources in the form of a picture, with each pixel reporting the amount of night
time lights across in a given square kilometer block, as measured by satellites.
Prime examples of putting the night light data to work include (Henderson et al.,
2012) and (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). An image of the 2012 DMSP
image of Florida is provided in (Figure 3.4). A sequence of these images enables
me to collect data for each county on the mean night light intensity and the spatial
distribution of the night lights as measured by the standard deviation of night light
intensity (referred to as σct hereafter). DMSP indicators of night light activity are
bottom coded at 0 and top coded at 63, though the summary statistics in (Table
3.1) suggest that none of the panels in my sample are consistently topcoded in this
manner. In this case, OLS would still be unbiased and consistent as outlined in
(Wooldridge, 2010).
County level data on the establishment counts by various employment sizes is
available through the Census “Statistics of U.S.Business” (SUSB below). The eco-
nomic indicators in this database are also partitioned by enterprise size and 2007
North American Industry Classification System description (NAICS below). Indus-
tries are reported at various levels of disaggregation, with 2 digit length descriptions
being highly aggregated, and 6 digit descriptions being very specific national indus-
tries.
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of establishment sizes across Florida’s 6 digit NAICS retail
industries. Each bin has a width of 4 employees
SUSB gives establishment counts for establishments with 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 50-99,
100-249, 250-499, 500-99, and 1000 plus employees. A histogram of establishment sizes
across industries and counties is given in (Figure 3.2). Inspecting this histogram, it
shows that most industries have establishments with fewer than 50 employees, so I
(arbitrarily) choose this level as the cutoff to classify an establishment as “large”. Two
of the establishment size measures I construct are the proportion of establishments
with employment exceeding the values in a given SUSB bin. For example, the variable
Proportion50+ is constructed by taking the count of establishments with 50 or more
employees in a given industry-county-year, and dividing it by the total establishment
count in the industry-county-year. An identical procedure is used for the variable
Proportion100+. A graphical description of the distribution of the proportion based
establishment size measures is found in the histogram in (Figure 3.3). From this
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Figure 3.3: A histogram of Proportion 50+ and Proportion 100+ across Florida’s 6
digit NAICS retail industries
histogram, I note that most observations have fewer than 20% of establishments
falling into these “large” classification. The “fat tail” in (Figure 3.3) also shows the
majority of the time large retail firms compose a relatively small share of total retail
establishments, there are select occasions where they compose the vast majority of
total retail. A third establishment size measure is calculated by dividing the number
of employees in a given county and industry by the total number of establishments in
that county and year. This variable is reported in (Table 3.1) as ”Establishment Size”,
where the mean establishment size is approximately 7 employees. The histogram of
this retail establishment size measure is given in (Figure 3.2), which again shows
that the mean and median establishment size (in employment terms) is certainly less
than 100 employees. In fact, the descriptive statistics in (Table 3.1) suggest that the
average retail firm size has approximately 7 employees and that (supposing it behaves
100
like a normal random variable just for argument sake) the majority of Florida’s retail
establishments have fewer than 6.6 + 2 ∗ √19.39 ≈ 15 employees.
The “Walmart effect” hypothesis would be that as counties experience growth in
economic activity we should see a reallocation within retail industries towards larger
establishments. Additionally, counties with more variation in economic activity may
have a more diverse consumer base, and therefore are attractive to larger retail estab-
lishments that may offer a collection of higher order goods and services. As economic
activity becomes distributed in a less homogeneous fashion, I expect to see an in-
crease in the various establishment size measures. What is really being measured by
the standard deviation of night light intensity? Consider (Figure 3.5), which repro-
duces the night light data on 6 Florida counties: 3 with the most homogeneity (lowest
σ) of economic activity and 3 with the most heterogeneity (highest σ) in economic
activity. It appears that the dispersion of night lights are positively correlated with
the mean night light intensity. This is confirmed by the strong, almost linear rela-
tionship evidence in (Figure 3.6), which is a scatter plot of the standard deviation of
night light against the mean night light intensity within all counties and years in the
sample. What is clear from (Figure 3.6) is that counties with lower absolute levels of
economic activity also have a more uniform distribution of economic activity, while
increasing mean economic activity correlates highly with more spatial variation in the
activity.
.
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Figure 3.4: DMSP image of Florida’s night light activity
Figure 3.5: Florida’s most and least uniform economic activity counties by night light
activity
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Figure 3.6: Scatter of mean night light intensity against standard deviation of night
lights, county level
3.2.2 Specification
I estimate a dynamic panel model via the process described in (Blundell and Bond,
1998) and (Blundell and Bond, 1999). I consider the model
rict = αrict−1 + xctβ + uict
= αrict−1
+ β1∆lightsct + β2∆lightsct−1
+ β3σct + β4σct−1
+ θt + ηic + eict
(3.1)
The index ict represents retail industry i in county c during year t. Each panel is an
industry-county pair ic observed through time. All of the independent variables vary
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at the county-year level except for the autoregressive term which varies at the industry
level. The typical autoregressive process is augmented with effects like θt which
represent a systematic shock for the year t common to all industries and counties. ηic
is the panel fixed effect representing one of the many reasons that OLS would yield
biased estimates. Thus it will be necessary to develop an approach that only uses
variation within a panel in order to mitigate any such confounding effects that are
time invariant.
An immediate concern is that an economic activity indicator like the night light
intensity would have a lot of persistence, perhaps even exhibit a unit root. As a
precaution against spurious results, and after a regression to confirm the unit root
suspicion, I take the first difference of night light activity in order to make it sta-
tionary. This was not necessary for the standard deviation measure, which does not
exhibit unit root behavior. Included as controls are a full set of year indicators cap-
turing shocks common to all industry county pairs in a given year. I supplement the
traditional GMM style instruments with an interaction between 3 period lagged first
difference (growth) of night lights and 3 period lagged first difference of the standard
deviation of night lights (∆lightsct−3 ∗∆σct−3).
3.3 Results and Discussion
Examining the results in (Table 3.2), the fact that the parameter on the lagged depen-
dent variable α is statistically significant suggests that there is a dynamic adjustment
process by retail establishments to regional economic growth. The estimate of the
autoregressive parameter is far from 1, but still significant, suggesting that there is
not a high degree of persistence in retail establishment sizes. If it is actually the case
that retail labor is adjusted freely in accordance with current market conditions, a
low degree of persistence in retail establishment size is expected. The OLS results in
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(1) (2) (3)
Dynamic Panel OLS OLS
establishment sizeict−1 0.237∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ -
(3.30) (26.17)
∆lightsct 0.132
∗ -0.278∗ -0.464∗∗
(2.40) (-2.44) (-2.82)
∆lightsct−1 0.0289 -0.186∗ -0.489∗∗
(0.59) (-2.17) (-3.01)
σct 0.164
∗∗∗ 0.00274 -0.280
(4.03) (0.03) (-1.53)
σct−1 -0.0261 0.0854 0.739∗∗∗
(-0.70) (0.79) (4.05)
Constant 1.204∗ 0.304 -0.859
(2.15) (1.18) (-1.67)
N 15527 22840 22840
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.2: Dynamic Panel and OLS estimation results
column 2 of (Table 3.2) would naively suggest that retail establishment sizes exhibit
much more persistence than is the case for the dynamic panel estimation results.
Since the autoregressive parameter is sufficiently far from 1, it should also be the case
that the GMM style instruments do not suffer from the weakness problem typically
encountered with highly persistent dependent variables and small time periods.
The first significant estimate in the results suggests that holding all independent
variables constant, changes in the mean night light intensity are associated with larger
retail establishments. This suggests that counties with growing economic activity
experience contemporaneous growth in the size of the retail establishments within the
county. Evidence of this is provided in the significant and positive estimate for the
parameter on the change in night light activity (∆lightsct). Interpreting these results
goes as follows: for a every unit increase in the growth of night light activity, there is
an increase of approximately 0.1 employees per firm in the current period. Obviously
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this does not mean that every firm adds a fraction of a worker, but that representative
retail establishments already competing in the county are growing larger.
The autocorrelation parameter estimate (first row in Table 3.2) suggests that
each short run effect is approximately 1
1−0.237 = 1.31 times as large in the long run.
Concerning the timing of adjusting labor inputs in response to market size growth, the
coefficient on past economic activity growth is insignificant. A null result of this sort
can have various meanings that I cannot explain in the current investigation. It could
be that the effect is so small that my regression techniques have insufficient power to
detect them. The fact that the contemporaneous growth effect β1 is significant and
positive suggests with the null result on the lagged effect can be easily rationalized
from a business practice standpoint. Retail managers likely make scheduling and
hiring decisions based on sales performance within the current year and likely place
little weight on the past year’s changes in economic activity. This is reasonable
considering they have access to better data at higher frequency than that which is
available through Census data.
Another economically significant result from (Table 3.2)is that a ceteris paribus in-
crease in the dispersion of economic activity within the county is met with an increase
in retail establishment size. The estimated partial correlation βˆ3 > 0 suggests that
counties experiencing increases in the spatial dispersion of economic activity are simul-
taneously experiencing concentration into larger retail establishments. An example
of interpreting the estimated marginal effect βˆ3 in an economic context would suggest
that Liberty county, Florida’s county with the lowest dispersion in economic activ-
ity, on average would have 4 fewer employees per retail establishment than Broward
county purely on account of the effect of dispersion on retail sizes. OLS results would
suggest that there is no dynamic relationship between these variables.
After estimating (3.1), I test (and reject) that the behavior of the residuals is
AR(2) in nature at the 95 % confidence level. I estimate standard errors via the two
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step process described in (Windmeijer, 2005). Looking across the columns in (Table
3.2) The biased OLS results in column 2 of (Table 3.2) would suggest that growth
in economic activity within the county is associated with increasingly smaller retail
establishments, which does not make economic or intuitive sense. Further, the OLS
results would suggest that retail establishment size this period is relatively smaller if
there was growth in economic activity in the previous period. The signs of the OLS
coefficients speaks to the need for the instrumentation in the system GMM approach.
3.4 Conclusion
In this investigation I wanted to demonstrate the utility of a new source of market
size data for analysis in industrial organization and regional economic analysis. This
satellite data, that measures light at night at the square kilometer level, has many
advantages over reported income based measures like those available through the
Census or IRS. For instance, it allows for describing and measuring regional economic
growth and the spatial distribution of all economic activity in an area including that
which may not be reported. Empirically, I presented a model that tested a tenet of
central place theory. My strategy was to use a panel of retail industry-county pairs
through time to show that variation in the light activity within the county exhibits a
positive partial correlation with average establishment size within the industry-county
pair. There was sufficient evidence to suggest that economic growth is met with an
increase in retail establishment sizes, suggesting that growth is absorbed on intensive
margins.
The dynamic panel specification also allowed me to make a hypothesis about the
timing of the changes in retail labor inputs to regional economic growth. Since retail
firms are able to adjust their labor input very freely, only current changes in economic
activity matter for establishment size (in employment terms, distant past changes
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in economic activity should be irrelevant for the size today. There was sufficient
evidence to reject the hypothesis that past changes in economic activity, as measured
by changes in night light activity in the past, have a significant partial correlation
with retail
There are many things that I need to continue working on for this paper to im-
prove in the future. The largest improvements would come with adopting better
quality data, preferably at the firm level with quarterly or monthly data. This would
allow a “higher resolution” investigation of the adjustment dynamics explored by this
paper. It’s doubtful that the night light data would be available at such high fre-
quency. It’s also very doubtful that reported income based measures are available at
higher frequency than annually. Firm level data is only accessible under very close
supervision.
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APPENDICES
3.4.1 Chapter 1 Appendix
Figures
(1)
amazon intensity
porn intensity 0.0954
(7.82)
population 0.000000433
(23.20)
net access 0.0136
(7.37)
wage 0.0551
(3.69)
cons 32.87
(36.62)
N 5228
F (4, 6528) 177.53
t statistics in parentheses
Table 3.5: First stage IV results
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Market Structure (MS) 805.142 1172.527 3 12251 4007
Fitted MS- Neg. Binomial 805.142 1172.277 3.887 12092.043 4007
Fitted MS- Poisson 805.142 1172.277 3.887 12092.043 4007
Fitted MS- Linear 805.142 1172.023 -28.912 12046.549 4007
Fitted MS- log-log 811.866 1177.887 3.458 12208.912 3956
Table 3.3: Observed and fitted market structure summary statistics
115
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
D
en
si
ty
-14 -12 -10 -8 -6
Firms Per Capita
Density 2007 Density 2011
Retailers Per Capita
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Figure 3.8: Variation in Google search frequency over time
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Figure 3.13: Internet exposure estimates
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Actual Variance:Mean ratio 2.649 5.391 0 97.273 4007
Predicted Var:Mean ratio- Neg. Binomial 1.839 4.331 0 96.982 3988
Predicted Var:Mean ratio- Poisson 1.839 4.331 0 96.982 3988
Predicted Var:Mean ratio- Linear 3.742 7.25 0 110.541 3988
Predicted Var:Mean ratio- Log-Log 1.735 3.259 0 64.788 3913
Table 3.4: Dispersion summary statistics
119
3.4.2 Theory Appendix
As in Eckel (2009) and Salop (1979), I suppose the economy is populated by a mass
of L consumers who live on a circle of circumference Ω around a business district.
Consumers are distributed uniformly on this torus such that the population density
is identical at all points, and given by L
Ω
. Consumers travel to one of R number of
retail outlets located on the torus, and travel is costly so that consumers visit only
a single outlet. Firms have endogenous “catchment” areas (δ to each side of the
retailer) identified by the marginal consumer who is indifferent between two retail
outlets. Catchment areas (i.e. 2δ) will be equal in a symmetric equilibrium, and the
catchment area of all retailers must add up the to circumfrence of the circle. This
gives the relation:
2δR = Ω
The economy is characterized by N manufacturing firms across k identical states that
serve the retail sector.
Consumers
Consumers are associated with the index l, and have CES preferences that include a
taste for variety. Utility of each consumer l is represented by
Ul =
1
tl
N1+ρ−
σ
σ−1
(
N∑
i=1
x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(3.2)
in which x(i) are the i differentiated varieties of goods produced by manufacturing
firms, σ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between varieties, ρ ≥ 1 captures
the love of variety as discussed in Brakman and Heijdra (2001). An example of how
changes in the diversity preference parameter ρ is discussed in the Theory Appendix.
Each consumer l is not freely mobile, he or she faces a travel cost represented by
120
tl similar to the iceberg type costs described in (Samuelson, 1954). This travel cost
depends on the distance δl between the residence of consumer l and the retailer they
visit. As a result of this costly travel, the consumer will have a strong preference for
shopping at a single “catch-all” destination. Thus, travel costs are convex and follow
this specific form:
tl = exp(τδl)
The parameter τ captures exogenous influences on the travel costs to the consumer,
like that of the price of fuel or public transport, and represents a general measure
of travel costs and the mobility of consumers. Each household supplies one unit of
labor inelastically. I take it as the numeraire so that the wage rate is normalized
to one. The utility function above is maximized subject to the budget constraint∑
N p(i)x(i) ≤ 1 yielding an individual demand
x(i) = p(i)−σ
(
N∑
φ=1
p(φ)1−σ
)−1
(3.3)
In a symmetric equilibrium, Eckel notes that the price elasticity of this demand
reduces to
−dlnx
dlnp
= σ(1− 1
N
) +
1
N
This price elasticity is a weighted average of the substitution effect characterized by
σ, and the unit income effect.
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Love of variety
Consumers have a “love of variety” or a preference towards a diversified consumption
basket that is represented by the parameter ρ in their utility function:
Ul =
1
tl
N1+ρ−
σ
σ−1
(
N∑
i=1
x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(3.4)
As stated in (Brakman and Heijdra, 2001), this was a feature of (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977) that did not make it to the final manuscript, however was later adopted in
(Ethier, 1982).
To understand how this parameter represents a love of variety, consider a con-
sumer with utility represented by (3.4) and income m who faces i = 1 . . . N number
of differentiated products with identical price p. Consider two hypothetical con-
sumption bundles, A = (x1, x2, . . . , xN) = (
m
p
, 0, . . . , 0) and B = (x1, x2, . . . , xN) =
( 1
N
m
p
, 1
N
m
p
, . . . , 1
N
m
p
). The first bundle differs from the second in that all income is ex-
hausted on a single good, while in the second bundle income is split equally among all
goods available. The indirect utility function VA from bundle A is given by evaluating
the utility function at the consumption vector A, symmetric price p, and income m
VA(p,m) = U(
m
p
, 0, . . . , 0)
=
1
tl
11+ρ−
σ
σ−1
(
m
p
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
=
1
tl
(
m
p
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(3.5)
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Indirect utility for bundle B is expressed similarly:
VB(p,m) = U(
1
N
m
p
,
1
N
m
p
, . . . ,
1
N
m
p
)
=
1
tl
N1+ρ−
σ
σ−1
(
m
p
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(3.6)
Proposition 5. The consumer preference for diversity parameter, ρ, does not appear
in the expression for the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution and therefore does
not directly influence consumer choice.
Proof: Let C represent the constant terms 1
tl
N1+ρ−
σ
σ−1 . Then the marginal util-
ity associated with good xi can be expressed as C ∗ ∂∂xi
(∑N
i=1 x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
and the
marginal utility of xj expressed as C∗ ∂∂xj
(∑N
i=1 x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
so that the MRS between
goods i and j can be expressed as the following
MRSij =
∂Ul
∂xi
∂Ul
∂xj
=
C ∗ ∂
∂xi
(∑N
i=1 x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
C ∗ ∂
∂xj
(∑N
i=1 x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
=
∂
∂xi
(∑N
i=1 x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
∂
∂xj
(∑N
i=1 x(i)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
(3.7)
Since the constant terms represented by C cancel, the marginal rate of substitution
does not depend on the consumer preference for diversity parameter ρ.
Proposition 6. The ratio of consumer utility from consuming a basket with equal
income share on all available goods to the utility of exhausting income on a single
good is increasing can be varied independently of the elasticity of substitution between
goods (represented by σ).
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Proof: Take the ratio of (3.5) to (3.6)
Manufacturing
Manufacturing firms produce individual varieties of the differentiated goods under an
increasing returns structure. Profits for a manufacturing firm are given by:
ΠM = (pw − β)Q− α (3.9)
where Q is world market demand given by
Q = x ∗ L ∗ k
which is the individual demand, x, by the L consumers in each of the k states. β and
α are the variable and fixed costs facing the manufacturer, and are denominated in
labor units. The wholesale price that the retailers will face from the manufacturer is
represented by pw. In the Eckel (2009), retail mark-ups are considered exogenous to
the manufacturing firm, and are treated as given 1. Profit maximization by manufac-
turing firms yields the optimal wholesale price that retailers face:
pw = β
[
1 +
N
(σ − 1)(N − 1)
]
(3.10)
1This assumption is made for simplicity, there is scope for research where manufacturers
have an option to commit their retailers to a given price by printing the price directly on
the p. This is a practice that is sometimes seen with potato chips, beverages, and some
baked goods. Nevertheless, relaxing it is outside the interest of the current investigation.
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Manufacturing markups depend on the elasticity between varieties, represented by
the parameter σ, and the variety of products available, N. Since each manufacturer
only produces a single variety, this parameter also the number of manufacturing firms
in the global economy. Equilibrium in the manufacturing industry is given by the free
entry zero profit condition:
kL = α(1 + µ)(σN − σ + 1) (3.11)
which includes the retail markup µ, consumer preference parameters σ, the firm/variety
count N of differentiated product manufacturers, manufacturing fixed costs α, the
world population L and the state count k. In turn, equation (3.11) can be solved for
the variety/manufacturing firm count N as a function of exogenous and endogenous
variables
N(σ, α, k, L;µ) =
kL
σα(1 + µ)
+ 1 +
1
σ
(3.12)
Equation (3.12) shows the nature of the relationship between retailers and manu-
facturers through retail markups µ as a determinant of manufacturing firm counts
N .
Retail
Retailers purchase the intermediate product from manufacturers at wholesale prices
pw. They combine this intermediate product with a labor input at a martginal cost
of γ per variety, which I liken to a “wage” since it is the income paid to the labor
supply. This constant marginal cost implies a constant returns to scale structure for
the retailers. Keeping the model parsimonious with constant returns to scale provides
a puzzling market structure result discusse. In order to determine the number of
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retailers in an equilibrium, we constrain them to a standard zero profit condition.
Profits are given by the expression:
ΠR(j) = 2δj
L
Ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
catchment
 Nj∑
i=1
[p(i)− pw]x(i)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
unit profit
− γNj︸︷︷︸
costs
(3.13)
The first term on the right hand side of (3.13) consists of the gross profit per
consumer, ∑Nji=1 [p(i)− pw]x(i), scaled by the relevant consumer count in the catchment
area. To arrive at the count given in (3.13), recall each location on the circle has
population density parameterized as L
Ω
, and the“length” of the catchment area 2δj.
From these profits the firms must pay their labor input. The second term, γNj is
this “cost of provision”, as it is the labor expenditure from providing Nj varieties of
the differentiated good at a marginal cost of per variety. The equilibrium number of
retailers is given by the zero profit condition of the retailing industry subject to free
entry:
ΠR(j) = 0→ τΩ
R + τΩ
L = Rγ (3.14)
After manipulation, it becomes clear that the result of applying the zero profit con-
dition to (3.13) as done in (3.14) results in an equation quadratic in R
γNR2 + γτNΩR− τΩL = 0 (3.15)
Using the quadratic equation, and taking the positive root of this quadratic expression
yields the number of firms in operating in retail R as a function of the exogenous
parameters γ, L,Ω, τ and the endogenous variable N .
R(γ, L,Ω, τ ;N) =
√
τΩ
√
4L+ γτΩN
2
√
γN
− τΩ
2
(3.16)
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Labor Market Equilibrium
Solving for equilibrium in the labor market requires showing that retail labor supply,
which was assumed to be immobile between regions and exogenously given by L
in each state, and is in accordance with labor demand, represented by the sum of
labor demand from retailers and manufacturers. All costs for both manufacturers
and retailers are denominated in retail terms, so we can express labor demand as the
sum of demand from both sectors. The manufacturing sector in each state demands
(α+ βQ) units of labor for each of its N
k
firms, combined with the γN units of retail
demanded by each of the R∗ retailers.
N∗
k
(α + βQ) +R∗γN∗ = L (3.17)
In the general equilibrium, the equilibrium number of manufacturers N∗ and retailers
R∗ are functions of only the exogenously determined parameters. The former is given
in (3.1), while the latter is expressed as
N∗(L,α, γ,Ω, τ, σ) =
(α(σ − 1) + kL)
(
αγ(σ − 1)τΩ +√αγτΩ (4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)))
ασ
(
(σ − 1)(αγτΩ) +√αγτΩ (4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)) + 2γkLτΩ) (3.18)
The labor demand in the general equilibrium is given by substituting (3.1) and (3.18)
in (3.17) and solving for L∗ as a function of the parameters. This is akin to finding
the L∗ that for which there is zero excess demand for labor, given by the expres-
sion N
∗(L∗)
k
(α + βQ) + R∗(L∗)γN∗(L∗) − L∗ = 0. Making these substitutions and
simplifying, the equilibrium labor demand is the L∗ that is the root of the following
equation
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0 = βk2L2x
(
αγ(σ − 1)τΩ +
√
αγτΩ (4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ))
)
+ α2(σ − 1)
(
αγ(σ − 1)τΩ +
√
αγτΩ (4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ))
)
+ αkL(σ − 1)
(
(βx− 1)
√
αγτΩ (4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)) + αγτΩ(σ + β(σ − 1)x+ 1)
)
∗
(
αkσ
(
αγστΩ− αγτΩ +
√
αγτΩ (4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)) + 2γkLτΩ
))−1
(3.19)
Comparative Statics
To determine the general equilibrium effect of a change in consumer travel costs on
the number of retailing firms, I take the partial derivative of (3.1) with respect to the
travel cost parameter τ :
dR∗
dτ
=
αΩ(2kL2σ + (σ − 1)(2Lασ + αγτΩ(σ − 1)−Ψ)
2(kL+ α(σ − 1)Ψ)
where I have made the following substitution:
Ψ =
√
αγτΩ(4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(4Lσ + γ(σ − 1)τΩ)
In Eckel (2009) it is easily shown that
dR∗
dτ
> 0
which suggests that the equilibrium market structure measure for retail, R∗, move
in the same direction as the change in transportation costs. Therefore, a decrease
in consumer travel costs dτ < 0 will be met with a consolidation in retail dR∗ < 0.
Note that this is the effect on the fully endogenized number of retailers, and the
transmission mechanism is as follows: the decrease in travel costs leads to lower
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Figure 3.14: Equilibrium effects of consumer travel cost (mobility) shock
markups, which increases demand for manufacturer’s goods, shifting their zero profit
line down as in 3.14, and shifting the retail zero profit condition downwards. Markups
decrease because the now relatively more mobile consumers are less constrained to
shop than before, and hence local retailers have relatively less market power over the
local consumers than before. This will lead to the classic reallocation within industry,
where the less productive retailers exit in favor of the more competitive retailers as
in (Goldmanis et al., 2010).
It can also be shown that as the population increases so too will the number of
retailers on account of increased local sales, dR
∗
dL
> 0:
dR∗
dL
=
α(σ − 1)τΩ
(
2α2(σ − 1)σ + k
(
−αγστΩ + αγτΩ +
√
αγτΩ
(
4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)) + 2αLσ))
2(α(σ − 1) + kL)2
√
αγτΩ
(
4kL2σ + α(σ − 1)(γ(σ − 1)τΩ + 4Lσ)) (3.20)
3.4.3 Statistical Appendix
Hypothesis Testing
See web appendix at bit.ly/davidvitt
129
3.4.4 Replication
Mathematica code
See web appendix at bit.ly/davidvitt
Econometric replication
See web appendix at bit.ly/davidvitt
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3.4.5 Estimates
Please refer to the NAICS code list below when referencing the regression estimates
below. Table 4 is the estimate of (1.7) with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
Note that GEOid2 is a variable that indexes the states plus the District of Columbia
as well as Puerto Rico. These correspond to the state codes as given in the CBP, and
hence run from 1-72 with some values being skipped (since we really only need 52
unique values in this range). The GEOid2 values in ascending order corresponding to
the states + DC listed in alphabetical order (so for all DC observationsGEOid2 = 1)),
with Puerto Rico last at 72.
Figure 3.15: NAICS codes for regression estimates
Nonlinear estimates: See web appendix at bit.ly/davidvitt
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3.4.6 Chapter 2 Appendix
3.4.7 Tables and Figures
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Figure 3.16: Establishment counts over time for treatment group (Brevard) compared
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Figure 3.17: Employment counts over time
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Variables Log Establishments Log Employment Log Population
Log Establishments 1.000
Log Employment 0.908 1.000
(0.000)
Log Population 0.415 0.504 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log Shuttle Budget 0.101 0.140 0.262
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 3.6: Cross-correlation table
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3.4.8 Replication
See web appendix at http://bit.ly/davidvitt
3.4.9 Unemployment Estimates
(1)
Unemployed
Treatment Effect 3702.9∗
(2.08)
2004.year 0
(.)
2005.year -1022.8
(-0.85)
2006.year -1490.2
(-1.16)
2007.year -345.8
(-0.30)
2008.year 2803.6∗∗∗
(3.48)
2009.year 8301.2∗∗∗
(6.49)
2010.year 9371.4∗∗∗
(6.33)
2011.year 8058.9∗∗∗
(6.63)
2012.year 6051.5∗∗∗
(6.31)
brev 12014.2∗∗∗
(6.98)
twelve 0
(.)
1.fipscty 0
(.)
3.fipscty -5779.0∗∗∗
(-3.97)
5.fipscty -890.8
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(-1.12)
7.fipscty -5856.1∗∗∗
(-3.95)
9.fipscty 0
(.)
11.fipscty 54821.9∗∗∗
(7.41)
13.fipscty -6196.6∗∗∗
(-4.04)
15.fipscty -1210.6
(-1.37)
17.fipscty -2020.7∗
(-2.12)
19.fipscty -731.1
(-0.96)
21.fipscty 3897.1∗∗∗
(6.79)
23.fipscty -4610.0∗∗∗
(-3.55)
27.fipscty -5497.2∗∗∗
(-3.78)
29.fipscty -6103.6∗∗∗
(-4.03)
31.fipscty 25148.1∗∗∗
(7.27)
33.fipscty 2717.0∗∗∗
(4.89)
35.fipscty -3408.8∗∗
(-3.12)
37.fipscty -6285.2∗∗∗
(-4.05)
39.fipscty -5059.4∗∗∗
(-3.69)
41.fipscty -6076.6∗∗∗
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(-4.01)
43.fipscty -6202.6∗∗∗
(-4.03)
45.fipscty -6145.1∗∗∗
(-4.03)
47.fipscty -6192.7∗∗∗
(-4.04)
49.fipscty -5669.0∗∗∗
(-3.84)
51.fipscty -4676.6∗∗∗
(-3.33)
53.fipscty -932.7
(-1.14)
55.fipscty -3498.0∗∗
(-2.94)
57.fipscty 35652.7∗∗∗
(6.66)
59.fipscty -6052.0∗∗∗
(-3.98)
61.fipscty -1068.1
(-1.22)
63.fipscty -5326.7∗∗∗
(-3.68)
65.fipscty -6164.2∗∗∗
(-4.03)
67.fipscty -6395.2∗∗∗
(-4.10)
69.fipscty 2957.0∗∗∗
(5.33)
71.fipscty 14811.8∗∗∗
(6.28)
73.fipscty 1141.1
(1.71)
75.fipscty -5293.0∗∗∗
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(-3.80)
77.fipscty -6380.3∗∗∗
(-4.09)
79.fipscty -5985.4∗∗∗
(-3.93)
81.fipscty 3759.0∗∗∗
(6.38)
83.fipscty 4295.2∗∗∗
(6.34)
85.fipscty -1902.1
(-1.94)
86.fipscty 71011.9∗∗∗
(5.41)
87.fipscty -4468.2∗∗∗
(-3.41)
89.fipscty -4306.7∗∗∗
(-3.52)
91.fipscty -1716.6
(-1.81)
93.fipscty -5060.8∗∗∗
(-3.65)
95.fipscty 34569.9∗∗∗
(6.25)
97.fipscty 3559.0∗∗∗
(5.66)
99.fipscty 39037.8∗∗∗
(7.76)
101.fipscty 8854.3∗∗∗
(8.35)
103.fipscty 24928.6∗∗∗
(7.68)
105.fipscty 14191.8∗∗∗
(7.40)
107.fipscty -3959.7∗∗
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(-3.26)
109.fipscty -1278.1
(-1.58)
111.fipscty 4586.9∗∗∗
(7.70)
113.fipscty -2235.8∗
(-2.22)
115.fipscty 5398.8∗∗∗
(7.85)
117.fipscty 8500.8∗∗∗
(7.96)
119.fipscty -4575.2∗∗∗
(-3.65)
121.fipscty -5401.6∗∗∗
(-3.83)
123.fipscty -5889.0∗∗∗
(-3.94)
125.fipscty -6266.1∗∗∗
(-4.06)
127.fipscty 11417.8∗∗∗
(7.72)
129.fipscty -5763.3∗∗∗
(-3.93)
131.fipscty -5049.3∗∗∗
(-3.72)
133.fipscty -5866.7∗∗∗
(-3.96)
cons 3025.4∗∗∗
(3.39)
N 603
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.4.10 Full Estimates
On the following table, each industry treatment effect is labeled “XXX.NAICS treat-
ment effect” where “XXX” represents a 3 digit NAICS subsector. For a full list-
ing of the 3 digit subsectors, see the following url: http://www.dlt.ri.gov/lmi/proj/
naics3indproj.htm. Each county has a fixed effect and is labeled by “X.fipscty”
where “X” may be a single or two digit number that is the FIPS (Federal Infor-
mation Processing Standard) code. A full listing of FIPS counties is available at
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/codes/cou.html.
(1) (2) (3)
Empl. Count Estab. Count Payroll
113.naics Treat Effect -1457.4∗∗∗ -126.1∗∗∗ -57711.2∗∗∗
(-11.33) (-12.72) (-9.94)
114.naics Treat Effect -356.6∗ -31.26∗ -17466.7∗
(-2.22) (-2.55) (-2.52)
115.naics Treat Effect -1107.7∗∗∗ -95.31∗∗∗ -43740.2∗∗∗
(-8.27) (-9.59) (-7.32)
211.naics Treat Effect 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
212.naics Treat Effect -878.7∗∗∗ -77.04∗∗∗ -36639.0∗∗∗
(-6.06) (-6.97) (-5.78)
213.naics Treat Effect -34.38 -8.902 -5366.1
(-0.19) (-0.65) (-0.70)
221.naics Treat Effect -1295.7∗∗∗ -90.26∗∗∗ -56298.1∗∗∗
(-10.32) (-9.51) (-9.91)
236.naics Treat Effect -1363.9∗∗∗ 6.366 -61706.6∗∗∗
(-13.56) (0.75) (-11.80)
237.naics Treat Effect -974.9∗∗∗ -66.24∗∗∗ -32579.8∗∗∗
(-9.37) (-8.21) (-6.58)
238.naics Treat Effect -237.3 347.1∗∗∗ -21118.3∗∗
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(-1.17) (14.49) (-2.65)
311.naics Treat Effect -1193.7∗∗∗ -77.97∗∗∗ -50317.1∗∗∗
(-10.13) (-8.30) (-9.09)
312.naics Treat Effect -228.9 -19.71 -12796.8
(-1.35) (-1.49) (-1.76)
313.naics Treat Effect 145.4 4.400 1734.7
(0.78) (0.31) (0.22)
314.naics Treat Effect -509.0∗∗∗ -34.63∗∗ -23124.5∗∗∗
(-3.48) (-3.22) (-3.56)
315.naics Treat Effect -102.0 -13.99 -7409.6
(-0.62) (-1.12) (-1.02)
316.naics Treat Effect 436.9∗ 25.43 13767.6
(1.99) (1.51) (1.50)
321.naics Treat Effect -1298.8∗∗∗ -98.47∗∗∗ -49417.9∗∗∗
(-10.23) (-10.17) (-8.56)
322.naics Treat Effect 122.4 7.620 47.47
(0.66) (0.52) (0.01)
323.naics Treat Effect -745.4∗∗∗ -66.91∗∗∗ -30467.5∗∗∗
(-6.25) (-7.65) (-5.49)
324.naics Treat Effect 209.6 7.420 4523.0
(1.03) (0.48) (0.54)
325.naics Treat Effect -776.2∗∗∗ -57.63∗∗∗ -32834.3∗∗∗
(-6.13) (-5.52) (-5.88)
326.naics Treat Effect -797.5∗∗∗ -56.62∗∗∗ -33188.9∗∗∗
(-5.99) (-5.35) (-5.53)
327.naics Treat Effect -1319.8∗∗∗ -89.94∗∗∗ -53685.7∗∗∗
(-10.97) (-9.56) (-9.69)
331.naics Treat Effect -274.5 -25.44∗ -14276.1∗
(-1.63) (-1.99) (-1.99)
332.naics Treat Effect -275.9∗ -32.58∗∗∗ -7550.6
(-2.44) (-3.70) (-1.42)
333.naics Treat Effect -15.11 -64.33∗∗∗ 16318.1∗∗
(-0.12) (-6.58) (2.94)
334.naics Treat Effect 10692.0∗∗∗ 4.622 768960.6∗∗∗
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(58.80) (0.43) (73.27)
335.naics Treat Effect 138.6 5.984 -1149.3
(0.86) (0.48) (-0.16)
336.naics Treat Effect 1090.6∗∗∗ -59.67∗∗∗ 155438.9∗∗∗
(8.75) (-6.07) (26.85)
337.naics Treat Effect -811.3∗∗∗ -66.65∗∗∗ -34102.3∗∗∗
(-6.33) (-7.11) (-5.80)
339.naics Treat Effect -980.9∗∗∗ -39.53∗∗∗ -45954.7∗∗∗
(-8.16) (-4.44) (-8.14)
423.naics Treat Effect -301.6 -2.553 5063.2
(-1.83) (-0.14) (0.56)
424.naics Treat Effect -1794.1∗∗∗ -92.92∗∗∗ -79584.9∗∗∗
(-14.00) (-9.46) (-12.38)
425.naics Treat Effect -1030.4∗∗∗ -61.04∗∗∗ -44610.8∗∗∗
(-8.96) (-8.21) (-8.39)
441.naics Treat Effect 361.9∗∗∗ 18.26∗ 13760.8∗∗
(3.51) (2.56) (2.65)
442.naics Treat Effect -1051.8∗∗∗ -66.97∗∗∗ -42722.1∗∗∗
(-9.76) (-9.01) (-8.08)
443.naics Treat Effect -907.4∗∗∗ -57.44∗∗∗ -37670.7∗∗∗
(-8.25) (-7.43) (-6.98)
444.naics Treat Effect -34.70 -44.74∗∗∗ -20705.9∗∗∗
(-0.35) (-5.95) (-4.14)
445.naics Treat Effect 1302.7∗∗∗ 2.841 6288.4
(9.26) (0.39) (1.29)
446.naics Treat Effect -406.8∗∗∗ -18.97∗∗ -20211.0∗∗∗
(-4.15) (-2.67) (-4.10)
447.naics Treat Effect -497.2∗∗∗ 27.76∗∗∗ -35319.2∗∗∗
(-4.53) (3.77) (-6.48)
448.naics Treat Effect -541.5∗∗∗ -47.27∗∗∗ -42777.6∗∗∗
(-4.82) (-4.84) (-8.61)
451.naics Treat Effect -772.4∗∗∗ -38.42∗∗∗ -37583.2∗∗∗
(-6.90) (-4.83) (-6.73)
452.naics Treat Effect 2955.7∗∗∗ -60.65∗∗∗ 37020.7∗∗∗
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(24.32) (-7.32) (7.57)
453.naics Treat Effect -620.2∗∗∗ 1.355 -39676.6∗∗∗
(-5.81) (0.19) (-7.49)
454.naics Treat Effect -1167.6∗∗∗ -19.90∗∗ -52605.9∗∗∗
(-10.69) (-2.60) (-10.16)
481.naics Treat Effect -715.7∗∗∗ -29.78∗∗ -37638.1∗∗∗
(-5.63) (-2.70) (-6.35)
483.naics Treat Effect -124.8 -3.144 -13684.3
(-0.74) (-0.23) (-1.88)
484.naics Treat Effect -1493.0∗∗∗ -74.87∗∗∗ -62636.6∗∗∗
(-13.20) (-9.94) (-11.79)
485.naics Treat Effect -449.7∗∗∗ -56.71∗∗∗ -23535.9∗∗∗
(-3.52) (-5.89) (-3.98)
486.naics Treat Effect 93.32 -8.008 1879.5
(0.41) (-0.47) (0.20)
487.naics Treat Effect -473.4∗∗ -42.12∗∗∗ -21379.9∗∗
(-3.04) (-3.68) (-3.16)
488.naics Treat Effect -418.1∗∗∗ -57.69∗∗∗ 2505.6
(-3.66) (-7.22) (0.48)
492.naics Treat Effect -493.7∗∗∗ -36.85∗∗∗ -22310.3∗∗∗
(-4.23) (-3.75) (-4.07)
493.naics Treat Effect -876.7∗∗∗ -64.62∗∗∗ -39136.1∗∗∗
(-6.93) (-6.35) (-6.86)
511.naics Treat Effect -1728.0∗∗∗ -84.22∗∗∗ -85821.4∗∗∗
(-16.41) (-9.81) (-15.59)
512.naics Treat Effect -881.2∗∗∗ -61.94∗∗∗ -31591.2∗∗∗
(-6.87) (-6.81) (-5.34)
515.naics Treat Effect -822.3∗∗∗ -67.88∗∗∗ -31487.6∗∗∗
(-6.59) (-6.73) (-5.79)
516.naics Treat Effect 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
517.naics Treat Effect -865.3∗∗∗ -66.48∗∗∗ -31652.2∗∗∗
(-8.28) (-8.45) (-5.40)
518.naics Treat Effect -506.2∗∗∗ -52.40∗∗∗ -22511.5∗∗∗
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(-3.97) (-5.40) (-4.03)
519.naics Treat Effect -376.4∗ -30.49∗∗ -18455.0∗∗
(-2.39) (-2.61) (-2.72)
521.naics Treat Effect 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
522.naics Treat Effect -550.1∗∗ -25.50∗ -30283.2∗∗
(-3.04) (-2.43) (-2.95)
523.naics Treat Effect -1112.0∗∗∗ -23.07∗∗ -52451.3∗∗∗
(-10.18) (-3.11) (-8.16)
524.naics Treat Effect -1898.5∗∗∗ -4.413 -98325.5∗∗∗
(-12.62) (-0.46) (-10.59)
525.naics Treat Effect 327.7 14.15 7395.8
(1.71) (1.00) (0.92)
531.naics Treat Effect -1264.9∗∗∗ 58.76∗∗ -58879.8∗∗∗
(-10.72) (2.81) (-10.29)
532.naics Treat Effect -1258.0∗∗∗ -70.20∗∗∗ -51919.0∗∗∗
(-12.12) (-9.34) (-10.26)
533.naics Treat Effect 279.1 17.74 9258.1
(1.50) (1.27) (1.18)
541.naics Treat Effect 5930.8∗∗∗ 618.2∗∗∗ 557849.5∗∗∗
(14.29) (8.78) (20.74)
551.naics Treat Effect -999.5∗∗∗ -76.79∗∗∗ -18262.8
(-5.10) (-9.23) (-1.21)
561.naics Treat Effect 3466.1∗∗∗ 327.7∗∗∗ 206596.8∗∗∗
(6.89) (12.85) (13.85)
562.naics Treat Effect -167.5 -70.95∗∗∗ 16861.2∗∗
(-1.41) (-7.59) (3.10)
611.naics Treat Effect -2993.9∗∗∗ -20.58∗∗ -101776.2∗∗∗
(-22.87) (-2.88) (-18.05)
621.naics Treat Effect 5408.0∗∗∗ 517.6∗∗∗ 381528.1∗∗∗
(18.63) (14.31) (23.72)
622.naics Treat Effect 3957.9∗∗∗ -82.68∗∗∗ 129896.7∗∗∗
(15.33) (-8.49) (9.67)
623.naics Treat Effect 2299.9∗∗∗ -35.33∗∗∗ 48685.6∗∗∗
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(18.86) (-4.42) (9.71)
624.naics Treat Effect 1136.3∗∗∗ -2.840 -7560.4
(11.06) (-0.40) (-1.53)
711.naics Treat Effect -894.1∗∗∗ -80.69∗∗∗ -53566.3∗∗∗
(-8.02) (-10.24) (-10.36)
712.naics Treat Effect -787.6∗∗∗ -60.45∗∗∗ -32280.9∗∗∗
(-5.63) (-5.61) (-5.16)
713.naics Treat Effect -1135.1∗∗∗ -41.56∗∗∗ -47596.7∗∗∗
(-6.10) (-5.48) (-8.15)
721.naics Treat Effect -1673.4∗∗∗ -72.39∗∗∗ -67704.5∗∗∗
(-8.51) (-9.01) (-10.91)
722.naics Treat Effect 7785.3∗∗∗ 424.8∗∗∗ 75813.0∗∗∗
(16.38) (18.24) (10.95)
811.naics Treat Effect -490.2∗∗∗ 73.86∗∗∗ -24072.0∗∗∗
(-5.03) (7.30) (-4.90)
812.naics Treat Effect -508.2∗∗∗ 86.40∗∗∗ -33675.7∗∗∗
(-5.22) (7.95) (-6.73)
813.naics Treat Effect 413.5∗∗∗ 178.5∗∗∗ -25765.5∗∗∗
(3.30) (18.45) (-5.22)
113.naics 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
114.naics -1100.8∗∗∗ -90.86∗∗∗ -40244.5∗∗∗
(-6.95) (-7.26) (-6.52)
115.naics -344.8∗∗ -28.81∗∗ -13909.0∗∗
(-2.66) (-2.85) (-2.79)
211.naics -2013.1∗∗∗ -167.3∗∗∗ -74817.0∗∗∗
(-8.80) (-9.15) (-8.29)
212.naics -578.7∗∗∗ -49.08∗∗∗ -21072.2∗∗∗
(-4.09) (-4.36) (-3.87)
213.naics -1412.0∗∗∗ -114.2∗∗∗ -51979.1∗∗∗
(-7.91) (-8.23) (-7.44)
221.naics -161.7 -17.85 -1413.1
(-1.34) (-1.85) (-0.31)
236.naics 952.5∗∗∗ 169.5∗∗∗ 49278.4∗∗∗
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(10.16) (19.77) (12.30)
237.naics 505.5∗∗∗ 23.12∗∗ 24785.6∗∗∗
(5.19) (2.81) (6.80)
238.naics 3602.9∗∗∗ 483.8∗∗∗ 122372.1∗∗∗
(17.83) (20.26) (16.78)
311.naics -99.76 -30.15∗∗ -3636.1
(-0.89) (-3.15) (-0.82)
312.naics -1228.5∗∗∗ -105.4∗∗∗ -44914.4∗∗∗
(-7.30) (-7.80) (-6.83)
313.naics -1602.8∗∗∗ -130.5∗∗∗ -59445.9∗∗∗
(-8.66) (-9.12) (-8.15)
314.naics -948.4∗∗∗ -77.49∗∗∗ -34586.8∗∗∗
(-6.62) (-7.05) (-6.14)
315.naics -1355.4∗∗∗ -111.1∗∗∗ -50301.7∗∗∗
(-8.31) (-8.76) (-7.69)
316.naics -1894.3∗∗∗ -151.6∗∗∗ -71478.8∗∗∗
(-8.59) (-8.81) (-8.21)
321.naics -158.6 -21.65∗ -6680.3
(-1.30) (-2.21) (-1.42)
322.naics -1579.8∗∗∗ -133.7∗∗∗ -57758.7∗∗∗
(-8.53) (-8.95) (-7.99)
323.naics -313.0∗∗ -25.21∗∗ -11178.7∗
(-2.74) (-2.82) (-2.50)
324.naics -1667.0∗∗∗ -133.5∗∗∗ -62234.3∗∗∗
(-8.22) (-8.46) (-7.89)
325.naics -410.2∗∗∗ -50.49∗∗∗ -8972.9∗
(-3.35) (-4.73) (-1.98)
326.naics -528.9∗∗∗ -57.50∗∗∗ -19291.4∗∗∗
(-4.08) (-5.31) (-3.81)
327.naics -137.6 -23.18∗ -4025.5
(-1.20) (-2.43) (-0.91)
331.naics -1182.9∗∗∗ -98.68∗∗∗ -43435.1∗∗∗
(-7.12) (-7.55) (-6.72)
332.naics 70.47 -14.54 4175.4
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(0.66) (-1.61) (1.00)
333.naics -259.3∗ -39.79∗∗∗ -4642.3
(-2.19) (-3.99) (-1.04)
334.naics -187.4 -81.74∗∗∗ 17827.2∗
(-1.19) (-7.40) (2.14)
335.naics -1317.0∗∗∗ -119.1∗∗∗ -46839.9∗∗∗
(-8.25) (-9.36) (-7.46)
336.naics -139.1 -39.45∗∗∗ -929.1
(-1.16) (-3.94) (-0.20)
337.naics -478.1∗∗∗ -39.47∗∗∗ -17844.9∗∗∗
(-3.87) (-4.13) (-3.67)
339.naics -149.5 -24.59∗∗ -432.5
(-1.29) (-2.69) (-0.09)
423.naics 1941.1∗∗∗ 210.4∗∗∗ 100467.6∗∗∗
(12.01) (11.14) (11.94)
424.naics 1255.7∗∗∗ 89.80∗∗∗ 59724.7∗∗∗
(10.21) (9.00) (10.88)
425.naics -114.0 29.92∗∗∗ -1849.4
(-1.04) (3.93) (-0.45)
441.naics 1500.7∗∗∗ 94.62∗∗∗ 60411.0∗∗∗
(15.54) (12.95) (15.20)
442.naics 233.4∗ 38.85∗∗∗ 3711.9
(2.30) (5.11) (0.91)
443.naics 76.01 18.32∗ -2227.5
(0.73) (2.31) (-0.52)
444.naics 805.3∗∗∗ 47.62∗∗∗ 21509.7∗∗∗
(8.65) (6.19) (5.78)
445.naics 2280.9∗∗∗ 102.0∗∗∗ 41519.4∗∗∗
(16.76) (13.61) (11.68)
446.naics 787.4∗∗∗ 69.85∗∗∗ 21231.8∗∗∗
(8.65) (9.58) (5.86)
447.naics 343.8∗∗∗ 68.12∗∗∗ 3148.0
(3.31) (9.03) (0.73)
448.naics 1373.1∗∗∗ 139.2∗∗∗ 16020.4∗∗∗
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(12.92) (14.02) (4.36)
451.naics 80.99 17.30∗ -6120.1
(0.76) (2.13) (-1.37)
452.naics 1518.9∗∗∗ 17.54∗ 29709.1∗∗∗
(13.26) (2.07) (8.37)
453.naics 499.8∗∗∗ 92.53∗∗∗ 4680.4
(4.97) (12.76) (1.14)
454.naics 204.2∗ 28.78∗∗∗ 7634.7
(1.98) (3.68) (1.93)
481.naics -741.7∗∗∗ -89.34∗∗∗ -20073.1∗∗∗
(-5.99) (-7.90) (-4.04)
483.naics -1291.7∗∗∗ -119.0∗∗∗ -41322.9∗∗∗
(-7.69) (-8.55) (-6.25)
484.naics 466.6∗∗∗ 53.76∗∗∗ 17805.3∗∗∗
(4.35) (6.98) (4.32)
485.naics -470.8∗∗∗ -41.41∗∗∗ -19003.3∗∗∗
(-3.81) (-4.21) (-3.86)
486.naics -1550.7∗∗∗ -118.1∗∗∗ -59590.7∗∗∗
(-6.89) (-6.75) (-6.80)
487.naics -984.0∗∗∗ -76.00∗∗∗ -36331.3∗∗∗
(-6.41) (-6.49) (-6.07)
488.naics 207.7 13.57 7269.2
(1.92) (1.66) (1.80)
492.naics -444.7∗∗∗ -61.27∗∗∗ -16159.0∗∗∗
(-3.95) (-6.08) (-3.66)
493.naics -333.8∗∗ -55.50∗∗∗ -11197.1∗
(-2.74) (-5.35) (-2.40)
511.naics 270.6∗∗ -5.896 28110.1∗∗∗
(2.73) (-0.67) (6.45)
512.naics -576.3∗∗∗ -43.18∗∗∗ -22524.1∗∗∗
(-4.64) (-4.64) (-4.56)
515.naics -434.2∗∗∗ -49.24∗∗∗ -9025.6∗
(-3.61) (-4.78) (-2.08)
516.naics -1600.8∗∗∗ -127.8∗∗∗ -56020.0∗∗∗
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(-6.49) (-6.65) (-5.86)
517.naics 716.9∗∗∗ 19.36∗ 45378.0∗∗∗
(7.29) (2.41) (9.39)
518.naics -575.2∗∗∗ -53.72∗∗∗ -10511.7∗
(-4.65) (-5.41) (-2.33)
519.naics -1066.0∗∗∗ -85.63∗∗∗ -38240.3∗∗∗
(-6.85) (-7.14) (-6.36)
521.naics -4018.0∗∗∗ -315.9∗∗∗ -156446.2∗∗∗
(-6.16) (-5.44) (-6.12)
522.naics 2196.7∗∗∗ 176.4∗∗∗ 114276.0∗∗∗
(12.29) (16.51) (11.71)
523.naics 138.6 59.96∗∗∗ 43346.1∗∗∗
(1.34) (7.88) (7.89)
524.naics 1671.1∗∗∗ 151.3∗∗∗ 98535.3∗∗∗
(11.39) (15.50) (11.35)
525.naics -1785.1∗∗∗ -140.3∗∗∗ -65107.0∗∗∗
(-9.42) (-9.77) (-8.75)
531.naics 1429.5∗∗∗ 346.1∗∗∗ 54414.6∗∗∗
(12.72) (16.44) (11.74)
532.naics 276.6∗∗ 34.08∗∗∗ 8862.8∗
(2.84) (4.42) (2.33)
533.naics -1736.5∗∗∗ -139.9∗∗∗ -63231.3∗∗∗
(-9.33) (-9.78) (-8.69)
541.naics 5610.8∗∗∗ 911.7∗∗∗ 318459.3∗∗∗
(13.61) (12.91) (11.99)
551.naics 1701.1∗∗∗ -6.333 145022.5∗∗∗
(8.76) (-0.74) (9.82)
561.naics 6556.5∗∗∗ 417.2∗∗∗ 183295.0∗∗∗
(13.07) (16.31) (12.73)
562.naics -146.9 -22.17∗ -3541.4
(-1.29) (-2.33) (-0.82)
611.naics 1536.5∗∗∗ 52.46∗∗∗ 44065.0∗∗∗
(12.22) (7.14) (9.71)
621.naics 4823.6∗∗∗ 537.3∗∗∗ 252203.7∗∗∗
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(16.80) (14.85) (16.19)
622.naics 3070.7∗∗∗ -34.44∗∗∗ 151389.0∗∗∗
(11.97) (-3.47) (11.62)
623.naics 2117.7∗∗∗ 22.21∗∗ 50976.2∗∗∗
(18.22) (2.72) (13.67)
624.naics 1085.3∗∗∗ 83.72∗∗∗ 18717.2∗∗∗
(11.30) (11.43) (5.12)
711.naics -33.35 1.574 4382.1
(-0.32) (0.19) (1.11)
712.naics -669.8∗∗∗ -59.67∗∗∗ -25430.4∗∗∗
(-4.91) (-5.43) (-4.76)
713.naics 1455.6∗∗∗ 36.44∗∗∗ 25086.5∗∗∗
(8.04) (4.69) (5.26)
721.naics 1852.0∗∗∗ 30.27∗∗∗ 40375.3∗∗∗
(9.65) (3.69) (7.79)
722.naics 8077.3∗∗∗ 411.1∗∗∗ 107363.8∗∗∗
(17.07) (17.67) (17.80)
811.naics 703.8∗∗∗ 176.0∗∗∗ 19956.8∗∗∗
(7.78) (17.17) (5.55)
812.naics 899.8∗∗∗ 176.5∗∗∗ 13031.5∗∗∗
(9.94) (16.04) (3.50)
813.naics 2056.1∗∗∗ 205.4∗∗∗ 44191.3∗∗∗
(17.15) (21.02) (12.18)
1.fipscty 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
3.fipscty -1561.0∗∗∗ -122.3∗∗∗ -52802.0∗∗∗
(-16.67) (-14.35) (-13.76)
5.fipscty -279.8∗∗∗ -14.15∗∗∗ -10511.8∗∗∗
(-5.05) (-3.46) (-4.10)
7.fipscty -1395.6∗∗∗ -110.9∗∗∗ -45164.2∗∗∗
(-15.71) (-13.97) (-12.47)
9.fipscty 1098.4∗∗∗ 97.05∗∗∗ 45076.8∗∗∗
(11.97) (17.09) (9.56)
11.fipscty 6696.3∗∗∗ 610.5∗∗∗ 269196.2∗∗∗
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(18.46) (14.42) (17.89)
13.fipscty -1699.4∗∗∗ -139.4∗∗∗ -56324.6∗∗∗
(-16.51) (-14.53) (-13.75)
15.fipscty -688.2∗∗∗ -31.64∗∗∗ -24245.1∗∗∗
(-10.66) (-7.32) (-8.40)
17.fipscty -787.4∗∗∗ -45.87∗∗∗ -27806.3∗∗∗
(-11.43) (-9.16) (-9.21)
19.fipscty -630.7∗∗∗ -32.52∗∗∗ -23521.4∗∗∗
(-10.08) (-7.58) (-8.24)
21.fipscty 365.6∗∗∗ 60.45∗∗∗ 16532.2∗∗∗
(5.90) (14.79) (6.18)
23.fipscty -1007.5∗∗∗ -76.29∗∗∗ -34241.0∗∗∗
(-13.72) (-11.97) (-10.83)
27.fipscty -1484.1∗∗∗ -117.4∗∗∗ -48560.9∗∗∗
(-16.22) (-14.37) (-13.18)
29.fipscty -1781.4∗∗∗ -152.0∗∗∗ -57685.1∗∗∗
(-16.87) (-15.24) (-13.90)
31.fipscty 3860.8∗∗∗ 223.3∗∗∗ 166234.3∗∗∗
(18.02) (18.20) (16.66)
33.fipscty 258.6∗∗∗ 18.80∗∗∗ 7824.3∗∗
(4.83) (6.50) (3.19)
35.fipscty -1063.4∗∗∗ -69.22∗∗∗ -36224.1∗∗∗
(-14.20) (-11.91) (-11.27)
37.fipscty -1494.8∗∗∗ -123.0∗∗∗ -47691.8∗∗∗
(-15.44) (-13.94) (-12.42)
39.fipscty -1160.6∗∗∗ -89.56∗∗∗ -37861.4∗∗∗
(-13.75) (-12.30) (-11.01)
41.fipscty -1499.4∗∗∗ -126.6∗∗∗ -47606.0∗∗∗
(-14.96) (-13.87) (-12.22)
43.fipscty -1837.4∗∗∗ -159.4∗∗∗ -58565.0∗∗∗
(-14.84) (-13.62) (-12.40)
45.fipscty -1569.6∗∗∗ -127.4∗∗∗ -52012.9∗∗∗
(-16.46) (-14.65) (-13.52)
47.fipscty -1707.4∗∗∗ -140.3∗∗∗ -55272.9∗∗∗
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(-16.57) (-14.55) (-13.54)
49.fipscty -1484.5∗∗∗ -118.3∗∗∗ -48319.0∗∗∗
(-16.27) (-14.13) (-13.03)
51.fipscty -1317.6∗∗∗ -100.9∗∗∗ -44498.5∗∗∗
(-15.34) (-13.38) (-12.53)
53.fipscty -720.4∗∗∗ -41.28∗∗∗ -25856.7∗∗∗
(-11.13) (-8.77) (-8.81)
55.fipscty -967.4∗∗∗ -65.50∗∗∗ -33694.5∗∗∗
(-13.27) (-11.12) (-10.63)
57.fipscty 5123.8∗∗∗ 318.9∗∗∗ 217499.6∗∗∗
(17.77) (15.65) (15.56)
59.fipscty -1451.3∗∗∗ -115.2∗∗∗ -46947.2∗∗∗
(-15.40) (-13.59) (-12.44)
61.fipscty -554.2∗∗∗ -25.30∗∗∗ -18291.6∗∗∗
(-8.88) (-6.28) (-6.65)
63.fipscty -1196.4∗∗∗ -90.33∗∗∗ -40631.6∗∗∗
(-14.64) (-12.63) (-11.87)
65.fipscty -1520.4∗∗∗ -124.5∗∗∗ -50372.6∗∗∗
(-16.26) (-14.61) (-13.42)
67.fipscty -1862.6∗∗∗ -161.0∗∗∗ -60541.1∗∗∗
(-16.00) (-13.92) (-13.15)
69.fipscty -116.6∗ 11.36∗∗∗ -5524.8∗
(-2.11) (3.56) (-2.09)
71.fipscty 1222.7∗∗∗ 129.9∗∗∗ 40041.5∗∗∗
(13.65) (17.40) (12.03)
73.fipscty 149.6∗∗ 19.52∗∗∗ 5485.9
(2.62) (5.92) (1.91)
75.fipscty -1225.0∗∗∗ -94.03∗∗∗ -40340.2∗∗∗
(-14.46) (-12.77) (-11.59)
77.fipscty -2074.1∗∗∗ -172.8∗∗∗ -70357.8∗∗∗
(-15.48) (-13.25) (-13.56)
79.fipscty -1538.8∗∗∗ -122.0∗∗∗ -51600.0∗∗∗
(-16.89) (-14.78) (-13.83)
81.fipscty 68.24 27.78∗∗∗ 2826.4
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(1.26) (10.40) (1.14)
83.fipscty 6.165 17.74∗∗∗ -2084.0
(0.11) (5.88) (-0.79)
85.fipscty -381.9∗∗∗ -9.419∗∗ -12881.2∗∗∗
(-6.69) (-2.85) (-4.91)
86.fipscty 9055.9∗∗∗ 803.3∗∗∗ 346544.7∗∗∗
(12.98) (10.20) (11.94)
87.fipscty -683.1∗∗∗ -32.02∗∗∗ -24331.2∗∗∗
(-9.74) (-6.45) (-7.79)
89.fipscty -933.4∗∗∗ -62.61∗∗∗ -31167.7∗∗∗
(-12.29) (-10.51) (-9.66)
91.fipscty -216.6∗∗∗ -6.532 -7733.9∗∗
(-3.95) (-1.92) (-3.06)
93.fipscty -1286.8∗∗∗ -97.55∗∗∗ -43042.4∗∗∗
(-15.11) (-13.17) (-12.22)
95.fipscty 6523.2∗∗∗ 321.1∗∗∗ 249131.9∗∗∗
(17.80) (16.39) (17.34)
97.fipscty -341.2∗∗∗ -13.38∗∗∗ -14847.6∗∗∗
(-5.70) (-3.45) (-5.27)
99.fipscty 4565.7∗∗∗ 438.3∗∗∗ 191071.4∗∗∗
(17.69) (14.19) (16.39)
101.fipscty 31.04 35.16∗∗∗ -2451.6
(0.57) (11.50) (-0.93)
103.fipscty 3463.1∗∗∗ 264.4∗∗∗ 130062.1∗∗∗
(18.55) (16.31) (16.72)
105.fipscty 1092.6∗∗∗ 71.20∗∗∗ 38236.7∗∗∗
(14.57) (20.61) (11.94)
107.fipscty -931.9∗∗∗ -65.02∗∗∗ -31446.2∗∗∗
(-12.29) (-10.60) (-9.75)
109.fipscty -445.7∗∗∗ -10.06∗∗ -14941.5∗∗∗
(-7.46) (-3.00) (-5.44)
111.fipscty -324.8∗∗∗ -6.040 -12450.2∗∗∗
(-5.36) (-1.67) (-4.47)
113.fipscty -807.1∗∗∗ -47.63∗∗∗ -27185.3∗∗∗
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(-11.58) (-9.18) (-8.96)
115.fipscty 658.8∗∗∗ 93.25∗∗∗ 24225.0∗∗∗
(10.81) (15.74) (9.28)
117.fipscty 965.9∗∗∗ 92.95∗∗∗ 37909.4∗∗∗
(13.16) (17.05) (12.52)
119.fipscty -1199.3∗∗∗ -90.52∗∗∗ -40702.4∗∗∗
(-15.30) (-13.23) (-12.11)
121.fipscty -1329.4∗∗∗ -100.6∗∗∗ -45004.3∗∗∗
(-15.87) (-13.78) (-12.92)
123.fipscty -1342.3∗∗∗ -104.3∗∗∗ -44740.2∗∗∗
(-15.10) (-13.35) (-12.32)
125.fipscty -1886.6∗∗∗ -158.0∗∗∗ -61692.2∗∗∗
(-17.06) (-15.11) (-14.01)
127.fipscty 691.1∗∗∗ 85.94∗∗∗ 17743.7∗∗∗
(10.63) (17.79) (6.84)
129.fipscty -1352.6∗∗∗ -112.1∗∗∗ -43584.7∗∗∗
(-14.83) (-13.82) (-11.95)
131.fipscty -978.2∗∗∗ -67.35∗∗∗ -33112.0∗∗∗
(-12.69) (-11.05) (-10.05)
133.fipscty -1465.9∗∗∗ -115.5∗∗∗ -47943.2∗∗∗
(-16.03) (-14.13) (-12.97)
2004.year 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
2005.year 11.76 3.842 2832.0
(0.16) (0.56) (1.03)
2006.year 67.34 6.510 6181.8∗
(0.91) (0.94) (2.16)
2007.year 53.26 8.955 7470.6∗
(0.73) (1.28) (2.55)
2008.year 5.049 4.001 6135.0∗
(0.07) (0.65) (2.25)
2009.year -76.91 0.489 3554.4
(-1.16) (0.08) (1.33)
2010.year -102.3 0.310 3797.1
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(-1.55) (0.05) (1.42)
2011.year -86.61 -0.00583 5284.4
(-1.30) (-0.00) (1.94)
2012.year -51.11 2.988 7193.0∗
(-0.74) (0.48) (2.54)
volusia 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
cons 410.1∗∗∗ 27.08∗∗ 5441.4
(3.79) (3.13) (1.26)
N 39972 39972 39972
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.8: Difference-in-difference estimates
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